Social Contagion and the Survival of Diverse Investment Styles∗

David Hirshleifer†, Andrew W. Lo‡ and Ruixun Zhang§

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Abstract

We examine the contagion of investment ideas in a multiperiod setting in which investors are more likely to transmit their ideas to other investors after experiencing higher payoffs in one of two investment styles with different return distributions. We show that heterogeneous investment styles are able to coexist in the long run, implying a greater diversity than traditional theory predicts. We characterize the survival and popularity of styles in relation to the distribution of security returns. In addition, we demonstrate that psychological effects such as conformist preference can lead to oscillations and bubbles in the choice of style. These results remain robust under a wide class of replication rules and endogenous returns. They offer empirically testable predictions, and provide new insights into the persistence of the wide range of investment strategies used by individual investors, hedge funds, and other professional portfolio managers.

Keywords: Contagion; Investment Styles; Investor Behavior; Investor Psychology; Adaptive Markets

JEL Classification: G40, G11, G12, G23

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†Robert G. Kirby Chair in Behavioral Finance and Professor of Finance and Business Economics, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California.

‡Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management; Director, MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering; Principal Investigator, MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory; External Faculty, Santa Fe Institute.

§Assistant Professor and Boya Young Fellow, Peking University School of Mathematical Sciences, Laboratory for Mathematical Economics and Quantitative Finance, Center for Statistical Science, and National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data Analysis and Applications. zhangruixun@pku.edu.cn (email).
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1 Introduction

The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (Samuelson 1965; Fama 1970) maintains that market prices fully reflect all publicly available information. It is based upon the premise that there are market participants who will take advantage of any mispricing, and that investors with correct beliefs will grow richer at the expense of agents with incorrect beliefs (Fama 1965). In consequence, markets will be dominated by agents with accurate beliefs about prices (Alchian 1950; Friedman 1953).

However, an accumulation of evidence from psychology, cognitive science, behavioral economics, and finance has documented significant violations of individual rationality and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. In particular, there is evidence of social contagion of investment behavior in financial markets that is not always explained by rational information processing. To better understand these new dynamics of market contagion, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis can be complemented by the Darwinian perspective of natural selection. The application of natural selection to economic thought extends back to the 1950s (Alchian 1950; Penrose 1952; Friedman 1953). More recently, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo 2004, 2017) uses an evolutionary perspective to reconcile economic theories based on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis with behavioral economics.

In this article, we model the transmission of ideas between investors to analyze the evolutionary survival of competing investment styles. Motivated by the binary choice model of Brennan and Lo (2011), we consider a market in which each investor has a propensity to invest in one of two investment styles. We refer to this propensity as the investor’s investment philosophy. Investors with higher realized returns produce more “offspring” in the next period of the model by transmitting their ideas to other investors via social interaction. Selection results in differential survival of investors’ behavioral traits, i.e., their investment philosophies.

The distinction between investment style, a specific trading behavior, and investment philosophy, a general approach to investing, is much like the military distinction between specific tactics and general strategy. An example of an investment style is holding value stocks (i.e., stocks with high book-to-market ratios), or holding momentum stocks (i.e.,

1 Examples of social contagion include evidence from stock markets (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004; Ivković and Weisbenner 2007; Brown et al. 2008; Kaustia and Knüpfel 2012; Ozsoyev et al. 2014; Ammann and Schaub 2021), mutual fund and hedge fund (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz 2010; Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker 2015; Kuchler et al. 2022), and housing markets (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009; see also the review of Hirshleifer and Teoh 2009), and the discussions of social economics and finance of Shiller 2017 and Hirshleifer 2020.

2 See Holtfort 2019, Levin and Lo 2021 and references therein for recent examples of research on the interplay between evolutionary theory and financial market dynamics.
An example of an investment philosophy is the general approach of buying cheap stocks, or buying stocks with prospects for growth, where the investor uses discretion in defining “cheap” or “prospects for growth.” An investor with the philosophy of buying cheap stocks might on occasion feel that a rapidly growing firm such as Amazon is still cheap in price relative to its prospects, and therefore might sometimes invest in what is usually regarded as a growth stock.

We demonstrate that heterogeneous investment styles are able to coexist in the long run, implying the survival of a more diverse set of strategies than occurs in traditional portfolio theories. For example, under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe 1964), all investors hold the market, and therefore they all pursue the same investment strategy. Under the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (Merton 1973), all investors hold the market and a set of hedge portfolios, usually presumed to be small in number, implying only a limited amount of diversity. In contrast, our results are consistent with the stylized fact that numerous competing investment styles coexist in the market. Examples of persistent surviving investment styles include value versus growth, momentum versus contrarianism, large-cap stocks versus small-cap stocks, diversification versus stock-picking, domestic versus global, technical versus fundamental, and so on (Cronqvist, Siegel, and Yu 2015; Cookson and Niessner 2020). We show that the survival of diversity is a consequence of general principles of evolution in the face of risk.

Our model provides a framework for understanding the general multiperiod dynamics of contagion between a pair of competing investment styles. The bulk of the literature on the evolutionary survival of financial trading strategies has focused on the accumulation of wealth by individuals and its interaction with trading impact (e.g., the influence of investors with different beliefs or preferences on prices). We instead focus on evolution via the contagion of investment ideas. This focus implies that it is not necessarily the philosophies that promote investor wealth that survive, but rather, the philosophies that are good at spreading. In contrast to some studies which take this approach (Hirshleifer 2020; Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden 2021), we allow for broadly general probability distributions for the number of offspring in each generation, instead of assuming, for example, a Moran (1958) process in

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3 The term “investment style” is also used in a growing literature on style investing; see, for example, Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Teo and Woo (2004), Froot and Teo (2008), Kumar (2009), Wahal and Yavuz (2013), and Cronqvist, Siegel, and Yu (2015).

4 For example, Lettau, Ludvigson, and Manoel (2018) documented that the so-called “value” mutual funds seldom are tilted toward high book-to-market stocks, and are often tilted toward low book-to-market stocks.

5 This result is an example of so-called K-fund separation, in which the optimal portfolios that any investor may hold can always be formed by combining a finite set of K investment funds.

6 It is true that the financial performance of a philosophy is one important element in determining its ability to spread, but not the only element.
which the number of investors of each type changes by exactly one in each generation. This generality allows us to characterize the survival of investment philosophies in the long run in relation to the return characteristics of the underlying securities, including their mean returns, betas, and idiosyncratic volatilities.

The model has several testable implications. In the CAPM, the quality of an investment style is often measured by its excess return (alpha) above the market’s return at a given level of risk. This suggests that high-alpha strategies tend to survive (at least to the extent that alpha persists over time). However, we find that the survival of an investment style is determined by several elements, including its expected return, beta, and volatility. When determining a strategy’s survival with respect to these return characteristics, a style’s beta-scaled expected gross return—defined as the expected gross return of a style divided by its beta—plays a critical role. We call this return its scaled alpha.

Scaled alpha plays two roles in our model. The first is in determining a non-monotonic relationship between an investment style’s beta and its popularity and future survival. In particular, an investment style with low beta is promoted in market evolution only when its scaled alpha is comparable to that of the alternative style. In contrast, when a style has a much higher scaled alpha than its alternative, high beta can promote its popularity. This result implies that a style’s scaled alpha, not the traditional CAPM alpha, is a key determinant of the popularity of low-beta investment styles in a population.

The second role of scaled alpha is in determining a non-monotonic relationship between market volatility and the popularity and survival of an investment style. In particular, high market volatility promotes investment styles with high scaled alphas, and is opposed to investment styles with low scaled alphas. A high scaled alpha can therefore be understood as a defensive characteristic of an investment style, in the sense that investors will tend to allocate to styles with high scaled alpha in volatile markets. This can be empirically tested by examining shifts in investment style such as value versus growth, momentum versus contrarian, or fundamental versus quantitative as a function of market volatility.

More generally, our model helps to explain and predict the survival of a diverse range of investment styles given their return characteristics. For example, there are numerous categories of hedge funds with widely varying investment styles (Chan et al., 2006). The hedge fund sector is subject to intense selection pressure, and has been called the “Galápagos Islands” of finance (Lo, 2008).

\[ (7) \]

In biological evolution, this island group is a textbook example of the evolutionary adaptation that occurs after a species migrates into multiple segmented environments. The islands are distant from the mainland and have different micro-environments, while migration between the islands is difficult. This phenomenon of evolutionary diversification is known as adaptive radiation.
suggested that environmental segmentation was the source of evolutionary diversification. In fact, our framework suggests that diversity can persist even within a single non-partitioned environment, a surprising but important distinction in market evolution.

We check the robustness of our model implications by considering several extensions. First, we allow for very general replication rules that are increasing and concave functions of realized returns, capturing the intuitions that higher returns benefit the spread of a philosophy and that the marginal benefit diminishes. Second, return distributions are exogenous in our basic model, which we extend by considering market equilibrium with endogenous returns in the spirit of Lux’s (1995) classical model. When more investors adopt a philosophy, the demand of the stocks that this investment philosophy calls for buying increases. This demand is cleared in the market with supplies from a group of fundamentalists trading based on price deviations from the fundamental value, thereby setting the actual price. We find that the key implications from our model remain valid under both extensions.

In other model extensions, we allow for important psychological forces that affect investor receptiveness toward the investment philosophies of others. The first is conformist transmission (Boyd and Richerson, 1985), the phenomenon that investors view others as being well-informed and therefore follow the choices of these others. We show that conformist preference slows down evolutionary convergence, potentially leading to price deviations from fundamental values and lower degrees of market efficiency, a similar result to Scholl, Calinescu, and Farmer (2021) but through a different channel.

The second psychological force we investigate is attention to novelty, the phenomenon that investors are more likely to pay attention to a novel investment philosophy if it is very different from the most popular philosophies. Attention to novelty acts in opposition to conformist preference, and leads to an even higher degree of diversity among investment philosophies in the long run. It generates oscillations and bubbles in prices in certain financial environments, a phenomenon similar to models of herd behavior (Lux, 1995; Chinco, 2022), but again through a different channel. We also propose potential empirical tests for the survival of investment philosophies in relation to different proxies for attention in the empirical finance literature.

2 Literature Review

Our model is related to a large literature that uses evolutionary ideas to model the dynamics of financial markets. In classical models, agents are assumed to maximize expected utility with rational price expectations, but may disagree on the dividend process. Some studies
have found that individuals with more accurate beliefs will accumulate more wealth and dominate the economy \cite{Sandroni2000, Sandroni2005}, while others argue that wealth dynamics need not lead to rules that maximize expected utility using rational expectations \cite{Blume1992}, and individuals with wrong beliefs may drive out individuals with correct beliefs owing to different propensities to save \cite{Blume2006}. In complete markets, it is shown that assets are priced by a unique surviving agent. However, heterogeneity may persist when markets are incomplete \cite{Blume2006}, when learning does not converge \cite{Sandroni2005}, when non-accurate beliefs and non-optimal rules interact \cite{Bottazzi2018}, and when agents have recursive preferences \cite{Dindo2019}. We show that heterogeneity is persistent with return-based contagion dynamics, and is reinforced by psychological effects such as attention to novelty.

A second strand of this literature differs from the rational expectation paradigm by studying investment heuristics such as fixed-mix rules and functions of past realized returns. Under this more realistic setting, Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppé \cite{Evstigneev2002, Evstigneev2006, Evstigneev2008} show that the Kelly rule that invests according to the proportions of the expected relative dividends is evolutionarily stable. The investment philosophies in our model is closer to this second strand in spirit, and we go further to assume that they use no information at all.

A third strand of this literature concerns the performance of rational versus irrational traders. It has been shown that irrational traders can survive in the long run, resulting in the divergence of prices from fundamental values. In all of the three strands of literature above, market selection is studied from the perspective of wealth accumulation. However, our framework focuses on evolution via the social contagion of investment ideas. The reproducing units are not investors or traders, but instead are instances of investment philosophies. Our focus on contagion emphasizes the reproductive success of the investment philosophy, rather than the investor. As a result, it is not necessarily the philosophies that promote investor wealth or welfare that survive, but rather, the philosophies that are good at spreading. This is analogous to a disease-causing virus that spreads at the expense of its hosts. In fact, we consider a very general class of replication rules of investment philosophies between two generations that are either functions of realized returns, or are not related to returns and wealth at all.

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\footnote{Chapters in the handbook of Hens and Schenk-Hoppé \cite{Hens2009} contain an excellent list of classical models. Other examples include Lensberg \cite{Lensberg1999}, Amir et al. \cite{Amir2005, Amir2020}, Hens and Schenk-Hoppé \cite{Hens2005, Hens2020}, Lensberg and Schenk-Hoppé \cite{Lensberg2007}, Bottazzi and Dindo \cite{Bottazzi2014}, Bottazzi, Dindo, and Giachini \cite{Bottazzi2018}. Recent work has focused on risk-free asset as a numeraire \cite{Belkov2020}, game-theoretic properties of survival portfolio rules \cite{Belkov2020}, and portfolio insurance strategies \cite{Grassetti2021}.}

\footnote{See, for example, De Long et al. \cite{DeLong1990, DeLong1991}, Kyle and Wang \cite{Kyle1997}, Biais and Shadur \cite{Biais2000}, Hirshleifer and Luo \cite{Hirshleifer2001}, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman \cite{Titman2006}, Yan \cite{Yan2008}, and Kogan et al. \cite{Kogan2006, Kogan2017}.}
Other models focus on the evolutionary implication for asset prices. Lux (1995) provides a model of herd behavior that generates bubbles and shows that equilibrium prices can deviate from fundamental values. Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) propose the concept of adaptively rational equilibrium and show that complicated price dynamics such as chaos can emerge. More recently, Scholl, Calinescu, and Farmer (2021) show that the convergence to equilibrium (efficiency) can be very slow in market selection. In general, the dependence of investment rules on past prices generates feedback, market instability, and asset mispricing (Hommes 2006; Anufriev and Bottazzi 2010; Anufriev and Dindo 2010)\(^\text{10}\). One unique feature of our model is that feedback in the market comes from not only past prices, but also the behaviors of other investors that are not directly related to prices.

Finally, our model is also related to two recent lines of the behavioral finance literature. The first concerns how investors subject to cognitive limits form beliefs, and its implications for asset prices. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) consider agents who learn over a class of incorrect models about the persistence of the earnings process, which generates under- and overreaction to earnings news. Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) develop a model for learning in a multinomial world in which investors adapt to information on failing models. This generates a book-to-market effect, elevated conditional volatility, and negative conditional skewness\(^\text{11}\).

The second line studies how interactions in social networks affect investor behavior and asset prices, including, for example, Han and Yang (2013), Hirshleifer (2020), Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden (2021), and Kuchler and Stroebel (2021). Chinco (2022) develops a model for the \textit{ex ante} likelihood of bubble based on the intensity of social interactions between speculators, and shows that bubbles occur more often in assets where increases in past returns make excited-speculators relatively more persuasive to their peers. Pedersen (2022) studies the recent GameStop event using a DeGroot (1974) model in which investors update beliefs by listening to other people, and shows how social network spillovers can explain influencers, thought leaders, momentum, reversal, bubbles, volatility, and volume.

The key difference between our model and this literature is that we explicitly model the replication process due to social contagion and study its evolutionary implications for the survival of philosophies. We allow for general distributions for the number of offspring in each generation, instead of assuming, for example, the normally-distributed dividend processes as in Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007), the Moran (1958) process as in Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden (2021), or the DeGroot (1974) model as in Pedersen (2022). This generality allows

\(^{10}\text{Other examples of agent-based models include LeBaron (2000, 2001, 2006), Hommes and Wagener (2009), Chiarella, Dieci, and He (2009), and Lux (2009). See Lux and Zwinkels (2018) and Dieci and He (2018) for computational aspects of agent-based models.}\)

\(^{11}\text{We model social contagion rather than belief learning, so the underlying mechanism that generates the price dynamics is different.}\)
us to derive explicit comparative statics analysis with respect to the mean returns, betas, and idiosyncratic volatilities of the underlying securities, leading to several useful testable implications. In addition, our results from the psychological effects—including the reduced rate of convergence to equilibrium due to conformist preference and the price cycles and bubbles due to attention to novelty—also add to this literature.

Our model builds upon the analysis of Brennan and Lo (2011), which develops a binary choice model in order to understand the survival of economic behaviors in stochastic environments. We extend this model to study the contagion of investment ideas, explicitly modeling investment styles in relation to their systematic and idiosyncratic return, and treating investment philosophies as propensities to adopt different styles. We generalize the replication rules to a class of functions of realized returns. We take into account that in equilibrium, changes in popularity of styles will affect their expected returns, and we establish that a mix of investment styles is able to survive in the long run. Finally, we analyze how preferences for conformity or novelty affect the evolutionary survival of competing investment philosophies.

3 A Model of Competing Investment Philosophies

Consider two investment styles $a$ and $b$ in discrete time, each generating gross returns $X_a \in (0, \infty)$ and $X_b \in (0, \infty)$ per period. The returns realized in the $t$-th period are denoted by $(X_{at}, X_{bt})$. We assume that:

**Assumption 1.** The returns $(X_{at}, X_{bt})$ are independently and identically distributed (IID) over time $t = 1, 2, \cdots$, and described by the probability distribution function $\Phi(X_a, X_b)$.

**Assumption 2.** $(X_a, X_b)$ and $\log(f X_a + (1 - f) X_b)$ have finite moments up to order 2 for all $f \in [0, 1]$.

Consider a population of investors, each of whom lives for only one period and makes only one decision: to invest in either style $a$ or $b$. For example, $a$ could be a high-variance investment style and strategy $b$ could be a low-variance one. Other investment style dichotomies include value versus growth, aggressive versus defensive, momentum versus contrarian, and stock-picking versus diversifying. Each investor’s propensity to invest in style $a$ is denoted by $f \in [0, 1]$. This means that the investor chooses style $a$ with probability $f$, and style $b$ with probability $1 - f$. We will refer to $f$ as the investor’s investment philosophy.

The investment philosophy is a general approach to investing, whereas an investment style represents the actual trading behavior that the investor follows in some specific context. For example, the value philosophy refers in general to buying stocks that the investor regards
as a good bargain—relatively cheap compared to their “value,” which might be defined in many ways in different contexts. The value style is something much more specific, such as trading based on book-to-market or P/E ratio. The probability $f$ in this example is the probability that the value philosophy investor actually follows the specific strategy of trading based upon, e.g., the high book-to-market characteristic, and $1 - f$ that the investor follows a strategy with a low book-to-market characteristic.

Depending on their choices, each investor obtains gross returns $X_a$ or $X_b$. We assume that investors with higher realized returns are emulated more often in their behavior by other investors than investors with low realized returns. This is payoff-biased transmission, a common assumption in the literature on cultural evolution. One reason that this may occur is that investors who experience high payoffs may tend to talk more about their returns with other investors, a phenomenon that Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden (2021) refer to as self-enhancing transmission bias. In any case, investors with higher realized returns will produce more offspring with the same philosophy ($f$) as themselves in the next period. We therefore make the following simple assumption.

**Assumption 3.** $X_a$ or $X_b$ is also the number of offspring generated by the investment style $a$ or $b$, respectively.

Hence, the number of offspring of individual $i$, $X^f_i$ is given by:

$$X^f_i = I^f_i X_a + (1 - I^f_i) X_b,$$

where

$$I^f_i \equiv \begin{cases} 1 & \text{with probability } f \\ 0 & \text{with probability } 1 - f. \end{cases}$$  \hfill (1)

We assume that the trait value $f$ is passed on without modification to newly infected individuals. As a result, the population may be viewed as being composed of “types” of individuals indexed by values of $f$ that range from 0 to 1.

Equation (1) provides the model with its critical insight into the evolution of investor types over many generations, since it represents the dynamics between periods. In focusing on the evolution of the distribution of types in the population, it differs from the large body

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12 The mechanism that agents replicate based on past realized returns is also adopted by, for example, Lux (1995) and Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). One subtle but important difference between our model and these classical models is that we deliberately avoid making assumptions about investor preferences over past returns. In fact, in our framework, the investor’s preference itself can be determined by forces of evolution endogenously (Zhang, Brennan, and Lo, 2014b).

13 Some models assume a monotonic mapping from the gross returns $X_a$ and $X_b$ to the number of offspring (see Robson (1996), for example). Here we essentially assume that this mapping is an identity function for simplicity of our analytical results. Nonetheless, we generalize Assumption 3 in Section 5 and show that our results remain robust under a very general class of replication rules.
of literature that focuses on evolution of the distribution of wealth across investors.

Equation (1) also emphasizes that the reproducing units in our framework are not investors or traders, but instead instances of investment philosophies. As a result, it is not necessarily the philosophies that promote investor wealth or welfare that survive, but rather, the philosophies that are good at spreading. From this perspective, our model can be modified to describe the switching of philosophies in a population of long-lived investors, as long as $X_f^t$ is normalized by the total number of investors in the population. With this interpretation, investors’ behaviors may depend on historical information beyond the returns in the current period. We provide such an example in Section 7.2, and see also Lo and Zhang (2021) for an extension of the model in which agents have variable degrees of memory.

### 3.1 Population Dynamics

Investors in a given generation $t$ are indexed by $i$, and generations are indexed by $t = 1, \cdots, T$. We occasionally omit the subscript $t$ since the randomness across time is IID. Finally, a superscript $f$ denotes the particular type of investor as defined by the decision rule in (1).

Let $n_f^t$ be the total number of type-$f$ investors in period $t$, which is simply the sum of all the offspring from the type-$f$ investors of the previous period:

$$n_f^t = \sum_{i=1}^{n_f^{t-1}} X_{i,t}^f = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n_f^{t-1}} I_{i,t}^f \right) X_{at} + \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n_f^{t-1}} (1 - I_{i,t}^f) \right) X_{bt}. \quad (2)$$

Applying Kolmogorov’s law of large numbers to $\sum_{i} I_{i,t}^f / n_{t-1}^f$ as $n_{t-1}^f$ increases without bound, we derive the following almost sure population growth relationship from period $t-1$ to period $t$:

$$n_f^t = n_f^{t-1} [f X_{at} + (1 - f) X_{bt}].$$

Through backward recursion, the population size of type-$f$ investors in period $T$ is

$$n_T^f = \prod_{t=1}^{T} [f X_{at} + (1 - f) X_{bt}] = \exp \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \log [f X_{at} + (1 - f) X_{bt}] \right\}, \quad (3)$$

---

14Nevertheless, our approach is broadly compatible with an interpretation based upon wealth accumulation. When investors with higher realized returns accumulate more wealth, they tend to have more resources, and therefore may become more influential in the population. This influence is directly analogous to spreading investment ideas to more individuals, which justifies the alternative perspective of Equation (1). However, evolution toward dominance in the wealth distribution is not always equivalent to dominance in price-setting (Kogan et al., 2006, 2017).
where we have assumed that $n_0^f = 1$ without loss of generality. Taking the logarithm of the number of offspring, and once again applying Kolmogorov’s law of large numbers, we have:

$$\frac{1}{T} \log n_T^f \overset{a.s.}{\longrightarrow} \mathbb{E}[\log (fX_a + (1 - f)X_b)]$$

as $T$ increases without bound, where “$\overset{a.s.}{\longrightarrow}$” in (4) denotes almost sure convergence.

Expression (4) is simply the expectation of the log-geometric average growth rate of the population, which we will call $\alpha(f)$ henceforth:

$$\alpha(f) \equiv \mathbb{E}[\log (fX_a + (1 - f)X_b)].$$

(5)

The optimal $f$ that maximizes (5) is given by Brennan and Lo (2011):

**Proposition 1.** Under Assumptions 1–3, the growth-optimal type $f^*$ that maximizes (5) is:

$$f^* = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mathbb{E}[X_b/X_a] < 1 \\ \text{solution to (7)} & \text{if } \mathbb{E}[X_a/X_b] \geq 1 \text{ and } \mathbb{E}[X_b/X_a] \geq 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } \mathbb{E}[X_a/X_b] < 1, \end{cases}$$

(6)

where $f^*$ is defined implicitly in the second case of (6) by:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{X_a - X_b}{f^*X_a + (1 - f^*)X_b} \right] = 0$$

(7)

and the expectations in (6)-(7) are with respect to the joint distribution $\Phi(X_a, X_b)$.

The growth-optimal type $f^*$ is a function of the financial environment $\Phi(X_a, X_b)$. The role of $\Phi$ is critical in our framework, as it completely characterizes the effect of an investor’s actions upon the type’s reproductive success. The growth-optimal type $f^*$ dominates the population in the long run because it grows exponentially faster than any other type. We will refer to $f^*$ as the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy. It emerges through the forces of natural selection quite differently from the neoclassical economic framework of expected utility optimization, which implies deterministic choice except in special cases of exact indifference. The random behavior in (6) is closely related to “bet hedging” in the evolutionary biology literature (Cooper and Kaplan, 1982; Frank and Slatkin, 1990; Frank, 2011).\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)See Lo, Marlowe, and Zhang (2021) for experimental evidence in the context of financial decision making.
3.2 Style Returns

Proposition 1 holds for any return distribution $\Phi(X_a, X_b)$ that satisfies Assumptions 1–2. However, it is interesting to give $(X_a, X_b)$ a factor structure, and study how the contagion of investment ideas across investors affects the equilibrium investment philosophy $f^*$.

Let $r$ be the common component of returns shared by styles $a$ and $b$, $\epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$ the style-specific components, and $\mu_a$ and $\mu_b$ the mean returns of styles $a$ and $b$.

**Assumption 4.** The gross returns to the two styles are

\[
X_a = \mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a \\
X_b = \mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b,
\]

where $\beta_a > 0$ and $\beta_b > 0$ are the sensitivity of style returns to the common return component; $r$, $\epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$ are independent and bounded random variables such that $X_a$ and $X_b$ are always positive; and $E[r] = E[\epsilon_a] = E[\epsilon_b] = 0$.

Assumption 4 allows for a very wide set of possible investment styles. For instance, the two styles could be active versus passive investments, value versus growth stocks, fundamental versus quantitative strategies, domestic versus global investment, large firm versus small firm, long-only versus long-short, single-factor vs. multi-factor, and so forth. Different assumptions about the characteristics of $\mu_i$, $\beta_i$, $\epsilon_i$ (where $i = a, b$), and $r$ imply different cases of interest.

4 Evolutionary Survival of Investment Styles

We next ask the question: how does the evolutionary equilibrium investment philosophy depend on the style return characteristics (including the expected returns, return betas, and return variances)? We first identify the conditions for an equilibrium to consist solely of the choice of a single style, and then study the case where the long-run equilibrium population consists of investors who adopt both styles with positive probability. We briefly refer to empirical testing, but this topic is covered more extensively in Section 8.

4.1 Single Dominant Style

By Proposition 1, the expected value of the ratios $X_a/X_b$ and $X_b/X_a$ determines whether the evolutionary equilibrium investment philosophy involves only one style, or a combination
of the two. Let \( y \equiv X_a/X_b \), so that

\[
\mathbb{E}[y] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_a}{X_b}\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a}{\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b}\right],
\]

(8)

\[
\mathbb{E}[1/y] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_b}{X_a}\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b}{\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a}\right].
\]

(9)

For corner solutions, we focus on the case where style \( a \) dominates the population \( (f^* = 1) \). The case where style \( b \) dominates the population \( (f^* = 0) \) is similar. It is obvious from (9) that the following comparative statics on the conditions for \( f^* = 1 \) apply:

**Proposition 2** (Comparative Statics for Mean Return). *Under Assumptions 1–4, style \( a \)-investors dominate the population if \( \mathbb{E}[1/y] < 1 \), which tends to occur \( (\mathbb{E}[1/y] \text{ decreases}) \) if:

(i) the mean return of style \( a \), \( \mu_a \), increases;

(ii) the mean return of style \( b \), \( \mu_b \), decreases.

It is not surprising that a higher expected return of a style will promote its dominance in the population. To derive results for other return characteristics, we need to better understand \( \mathbb{E}[y] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[1/y] \). Applying the Taylor approximation of \( y \) as a function of \( r \), \( \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \) to estimate (8)-(9) we obtain

\[
y(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) = \frac{X_a}{X_b} = \frac{\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a}{\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b} = y(0, 0, 0) + \frac{\partial y_0}{\partial r} r + \frac{\partial y_0}{\partial \epsilon_a} \epsilon_a + \frac{\partial y_0}{\partial \epsilon_b} \epsilon_b
\]

\[
+ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\partial^2 y_0}{\partial r^2} r^2 + \frac{\partial^2 y_0}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} \epsilon_a^2 + \frac{\partial^2 y_0}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} \epsilon_b^2 + 2 \frac{\partial^2 y_0}{\partial r \partial \epsilon_a} \epsilon_a r + 2 \frac{\partial^2 y_0}{\partial r \partial \epsilon_b} \epsilon_b r + 2 \frac{\partial^2 y_0}{\partial \epsilon_a \partial \epsilon_b} \epsilon_a \epsilon_b \right)
\]

\[
+ o(r^2, \epsilon_a^2, \epsilon_b^2).
\]

After taking the expected value of \( y \), the linear terms vanish, since \( \mathbb{E}[r] = \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_a] = \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_b] = 0 \). The second-order cross terms also vanish because \( r \), \( \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \) are independent. Therefore, \( \mathbb{E}[y] \) can be approximated by \( y(0, 0, 0) \) and the second-order terms \( \text{Var}(r) \), \( \text{Var}(\epsilon_a) \) and \( \text{Var}(\epsilon_b) \). A similar approximation applies for \( \mathbb{E}[1/y] \), which is summarized in the following:

**Lemma 1.** *Under Assumptions 1–4, the second-order Taylor approximation with respect to
$r$, $\epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$ is

\[
\mathbb{E}[y] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{X_a}{X_b} \right] \approx \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b} + \frac{\beta_a \beta_b^2}{\mu_b^3} \left( \frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} - \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b} \right) \Var(r) + \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b^3} \Var(\epsilon_b),
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}[1/y] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{X_b}{X_a} \right] \approx \frac{\mu_b}{\mu_a} + \frac{\beta_a^2 \beta_b}{\mu_a^3} \left( \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b} - \frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} \right) \Var(r) + \frac{\mu_b}{\mu_a^3} \Var(\epsilon_a).
\]

We define $\mu_a/\beta_a$ and $\mu_b/\beta_b$ as a style’s *scaled alpha*, which plays a critical role in determining the comparative statics for return beta and volatility, as shown in the next two propositions.

The scaled alpha has an interesting analogy to the slope of the security market line in the Capital Asset Pricing Model. In that model, all investor portfolios satisfy the same security market line slope, $(\bar{R} - R_F)/\beta$, where $\bar{R}$ is the investor’s mean (net) return, $R_F$ is the risk-free rate of return, and $\beta$ is the portfolio’s sensitivity to the return on the market. In our model, $\mu_a$ and $\mu_b$ are gross returns, and the scaled alpha can be decomposed into

\[
\frac{\mu}{\beta} = \frac{1 + \bar{R}}{\beta} = \frac{\bar{R} - R_F}{\beta} + \frac{1 + R_F}{\beta}.
\]

Therefore, if CAPM holds, the scaled alpha for the two investment styles differ only by $(1 + R_F)/\beta$. In the same market where $R_F$ is a constant, this is determined by a style’s beta, so that beta becomes the key determinant of strategy survival. The importance of scaled alpha will become clear after the following results.

**Proposition 3** (Comparative Statics for Return Beta). Under Assumptions 1–4, style $a$-investors dominate the population if $\mathbb{E}[1/y] < 1$. Up to a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to $r$, $\epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$, this tends to occur (that is, $\mathbb{E}[1/y]$ decreases) if:

(i) the sensitivity of style $b$ to the common component, $\beta_b$, increases;

(ii) the sensitivity of style $a$ to the common component, $\beta_a$, increases, conditional on style $a$’s scaled alpha being sufficiently greater than style $b$’s scaled alpha:

\[
\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} > 2;
\]

(iii) the sensitivity of style $a$ to the common component, $\beta_a$, decreases, conditional on style $a$’s scaled alpha being sufficiently small relative to style $b$’s scaled alpha:

\[
\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} < 2.
\]
The conditions for style $a$ to dominate in the population are not symmetric with respect to $\beta_a$ and $\beta_b$. First of all, a higher $\beta_b$ will always promote the dominance of style $a$. Intuitively, this is because the log-geometric average growth rate (5) is nonlinear with respect to returns, and therefore the upside and downside for style $b$’s realized returns do not offset. As a result, the high systematic risk of the competing style $b$ promotes the success of style $a$ because the risk causes near-extinctions of style $b$ in the market selection process.

However, this is not always the case for $\beta_a$. For the same reason as described above, the high systematic risk of style $a$ reduces its own success, but this is only true conditionally on style $a$’s scaled alpha being comparable to or smaller than style $b$’s. If the reverse is true, that is, if the mean return on style $a$ is sufficiently strong relative to its risk (if style $a$’s scaled alpha is sufficiently higher than style $b$’s), the higher $\beta_a$ actually encourages the dominance of style $a$ in the population. In other words, style $a$’s high scaled alpha serves as protection from its own downside risk.

**Proposition 4** (Comparative Statics for Return Variance). *Under Assumptions 1–4, style $a$-investors dominate the population if $E[1/y] < 1$. Up to a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to $r, \epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$, this tends to occur (that is, $E[1/y]$ decreases) if:

(i) the variance of style-specific component for $a$, $\text{Var}(\epsilon_a)$, decreases;

(ii) the variance of the common component, $\text{Var}(r)$, increases, conditional on style $a$’s scaled alpha being greater than style $b$’s scaled alpha:

\[
\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} > \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b}
\]

(iii) the variance of the common component, $\text{Var}(r)$, decreases, conditional on style $a$’s scaled alpha being smaller than style $b$’s scaled alpha:

\[
\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} < \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b}
\]

Investment style $a$ tends to dominate if its idiosyncratic variance is small, for essentially the same reason discussed earlier for return betas. A high variance tends to work against a style because of the nonlinearity of the long-term growth, as reflected in (5); the upside and downside for style $a$’s realized returns fail to offset.

Again, since we are considering the conditions for style $a$ to dominate in this case, the results are not symmetric with respect to the idiosyncratic variances of style $a$ and style $b$. It is interesting that style $b$’s idiosyncratic variance does not affect style $a$’s dominance (up to a second-order Taylor approximation).
The directional dependence on the variance of the common component is determined by the scaled alpha. A higher variance of the common component encourages style a to be dominant only if its scaled alpha is higher than style b’s. Intuitively, a higher \( \text{Var}(r) \) increases the variance of both investment styles, and the overall effect therefore depends on the relative sizes of the betas of both styles. However, the effect of risk also depends on the mean return. A high mean return acts as a buffer that reduces the importance of risk. It is therefore the scaled alpha that matters, not merely beta.

Proposition 2 together give a complete picture of the comparative effects on the conditions of \( f^* = 1 \) (that is, always choosing style a) for mean returns, return betas, and return variances. Parallel results can also be derived for \( f^* = 0 \) (always choosing style b) using approximations for \( \mathbb{E}[y] \) in Lemma 1 instead. In the next section, we discuss mixed survival of investment styles.

4.2 The Evolution of Diversity

In general, if the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy involves both investment styles, \( f^* \) is given by (7). With Assumption 4, the first-order condition becomes:

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \frac{(\mu_a - \mu_b) + (\beta_a - \beta_b)r + \epsilon_a - \epsilon_b}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b] + [f \beta_a + (1 - f)\beta_b]r + [f \epsilon_a + (1 - f)\epsilon_b]} \right] = 0. \tag{10}
\]

Taking derivatives of (10) to \( \mu_a \) and \( \mu_b \), we immediately have the following comparative statics for the philosophy \( f^* \).

**Proposition 5** (Comparative Statics for Mean Return). Under Assumptions 1–4, when the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy has mixed investment styles, the equilibrium philosophy \( f^* \) increases when:

(i) the mean return of style a, \( \mu_a \), increases;

(ii) the mean return of style b, \( \mu_b \), decreases.

Not surprisingly, Proposition 5 is similar to Proposition 2; they both assert that a higher expected return encourages investment in that style. To empirically test Propositions 2 and 5, one can estimate historical mean returns of value versus growth stocks, and see if a change in their realized returns over time corresponds to change in the frequencies of value versus growth investors. These can be estimated, e.g., from mutual fund holdings or social media data. In the context of hedge funds, one can look at the average return of different investment styles, such as fundamental versus quantitative in a certain period, and correlate
that with attrition rates in different hedge fund categories. Section 8 discusses directions for empirical tests in more detail.

To derive further comparative statics, we again use a Taylor expansion to approximate the first-order condition \( \text{(10)} \).

**Lemma 2.** Under Assumptions [7][4], up to a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to \( r, \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \), the first-order condition \( \text{(10)} \) is

\[
0 = (\mu_a - \mu_b) [f \mu_a + (1 - f) \mu_b]^2 + \beta_a \beta_b [f \beta_a + (1 - f) \beta_b] \left( \frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} - \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b} \right) \text{Var}(r) \\
+ (1 - f) \mu_a \text{Var}(\epsilon_b) - f \mu_b \text{Var}(\epsilon_a).
\]

When \( E[X_a/X_b] \geq 1 \) and \( E[X_b/X_a] \geq 1 \), the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy involves mixed investment styles, and \( f^* \) is given by Lemma 2 up to a second-order Taylor approximation.

**Proposition 6** (Comparative Statics for Return Beta). Under Assumptions [7][4], when the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy has mixed investment styles, up to a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to \( r, \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \), the equilibrium philosophy \( f^* \) increases when:

(i) \( \beta_a \) increases, if \( \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_b/\beta_b} > 2 + \frac{f^*}{1-f^*} \left( \frac{\beta_b}{\beta_a} \right) \) \footnote{This is always true when \( f^* \leq \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_a + \mu_b} \) because the right hand side reduces to \( 2 + \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_a + \mu_b} \).}

(ii) \( \beta_a \) decreases, if \( \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_b/\beta_b} < 2 + \frac{f^*}{1-f^*} \left( \frac{\beta_b}{\beta_a} \right) \) \footnote{This is always true when \( f^* \geq \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_a + \mu_b} \), since the right hand side reduces to \( 2 + \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_a + \mu_b} \).}

(iii) \( \beta_b \) decreases, if \( \frac{\mu_b/\beta_b}{\mu_a/\beta_a} > 2 + \frac{f^*}{1-f^*} \left( \frac{\beta_a}{\beta_b} \right) \) \footnote{This is always true when \( f^* \leq \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_a + \mu_b} \) because the right hand side reduces to \( 2 + \frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_a + \mu_b} \).}

(iv) \( \beta_b \) increases, if \( \frac{\mu_b/\beta_b}{\mu_a/\beta_a} < 2 + \frac{f^*}{1-f^*} \left( \frac{\beta_a}{\beta_b} \right) \)

The relationship between the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy \( f^* \) and return beta is determined by three components: the ratio of scaled alphas, the ratio of betas, and the philosophy \( f^* \). Figure 1 shows the regions in which the return beta promotes or opposes the investment style, as a function of the ratio of the scaled alpha and the philosophy \( f^* \).

Proposition 6 generalizes Proposition 3 from the case of a single dominant style to the case of mixed styles. To see this, suppose style \( a \) is dominant and \( f^* = 1 \). The condition in the fourth item of Proposition 6 is always true, and therefore the dominance tends to occur when \( \beta_b \) increases, which corresponds to the first item of Proposition 3, and \( f^* = 1 \) in Figure 1b. Similarly, the condition in the first two items of Proposition 6 reduces to the second
Figure 1: Comparative Statics for Return Beta: $\beta_a$ (1a) and $\beta_b$ (1b). In the case of $\beta_a$ (1a), the vertical axis represents the ratio of the scaled alpha, $\mu_a/\beta_a$ and $\mu_b/\beta_b$, and the horizontal axis represents the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy, $f^*$. Three lines of different colors represent the boundaries between promoting and demoting style $a$ for three different ratios of beta, $\beta_a/\beta_b$. The upper region represents when $\beta_a$ promotes style $a$, while the lower region represents when $\beta_a$ opposes style $a$. The case of $\beta_b$ (1b) is symmetrical.

and third item of Proposition 3 trivially, and this corresponds to $f^* = 1$ in Figure 1a. Once again, the scaled alphas $\mu_a/\beta_a$ and $\mu_b/\beta_b$ play a critical role in determining the direction of beta’s impact on the philosophy $f^*$. Instead of threshold 2 in Proposition 3, the threshold here is adjusted by a positive amount, the adjustment depending on $f^*$ and $\beta_a/\beta_b$, as shown in Figure 1.

Factor sensitivity $\beta_a$ always opposes style $a$ when $f^* \leq \frac{\mu_b}{\mu_a+\mu_b}$. Intuitively, this means that when the equilibrium frequency of style $a$-investors is small relative to the proportion of style $b$’s expected return $\frac{\mu_b}{\mu_a+\mu_b}$, it promotes the survival of a philosophy to decrease the weight of style $a$ as style $a$’s beta increases. On the other hand, when $f^* \geq \frac{\mu_b}{\mu_a+\mu_b}$, it promotes the survival of a philosophy to decrease the weight of style $b$ as style $b$’s beta increases, symmetric to the case for $\beta_a$.

When two investment styles have comparable scaled alphas ($\frac{\mu_a/\beta_a}{\mu_b/\beta_b} \approx 1$), $\beta_a$ opposes style $a$ and $\beta_b$ opposes style $b$. In other words, a lower beta investment style is preferred if its scaled alpha is comparable to other styles in the market. In the context of hedge funds, a testable implication is that a low beta strategy should attract more investors after controlling...
for other factors such as expected return and volatility, especially when the scaled alpha is comparable with alternative investment styles.

This result is derived using exogenous returns (Assumption 4). However, if investors are attracted to the low-beta style, they may drive up its price and drive down its expected return, which tends to have a negative feedback effect on the survival of the low-beta style. Nevertheless, we show that these results hold in a market equilibrium setting with endogenous returns in Section 6.

In contrast, if one investment style has a much higher scaled alpha than the other style (corresponding to the upper regions in Figure 1), a higher beta actually promotes the popularity of that style. This is because the scaled alpha is so large that it gives substantial downside protection against any increase in variance brought by a higher beta. More variance becomes good for survival in this case. For alternative investments such as hedge funds, private equity and venture capital, the expected return can be very high and beta can be very low. Therefore, the scaled alpha for these investments can be much higher than that of traditional investment styles. Our model predicts that high-beta styles are favored in this case. In the context of the stock market, this implies that investment styles in high beta stocks will gain popularity if their scaled alphas are sufficiently high, leading to a decrease in returns. In contrast, investment styles in low beta stocks lose popularity, leading to higher returns. This outcome is consistent with the empirical anomaly that low beta stocks earn high expected returns, as contrasted with the traditional risk premium theory that they should earn low expected returns. Our result can therefore justify the use of a common defensive (low-risk) “smart beta” strategy [Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014].

Proposition 7 (Comparative Statics for Return Variance). Under Assumptions 1–4, when the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy has mixed investment styles, up to a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to $r$, $\epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$, the equilibrium philosophy $f^*$ increases when:

(i) the variance of style-specific component for $a$, $\text{Var}(\epsilon_a)$, decreases;

(ii) the variance of style-specific component for $b$, $\text{Var}(\epsilon_b)$, increases;

(iii) the variance of the common component, $\text{Var}(r)$, increases, conditional on style $a$’s scaled alpha being greater than style $b$’s scaled alpha: $\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} > \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b}$;

(iv) the variance of the common component, $\text{Var}(r)$, decreases, conditional on style $a$’s scaled alpha being smaller than style $b$’s scaled alpha: $\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} < \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b}$. 
There will be more style $a$-investors if style $a$’s idiosyncratic variance is small, and if style $b$’s idiosyncratic variance is large. This also generalizes Proposition $4$ from the case of a single dominant style to the case of mixed styles. Intuitively, a higher style-specific variance discourages investment in that style$^{18}$ because of the nonlinearity of the long-term growth as reflected in $(5)$. In other words, the possibility of near-wipeouts of an investment style is disproportionately important, opposing the survival of more volatile investment styles.

The directional dependence of the equilibrium philosophy on the variance of the common component is again determined by the scaled alpha. A higher variance of the common component encourages investment in the style with a higher scaled alpha. The reason is similar to that in our previous discussions. A higher $\text{Var}(r)$ increases the variance of both investment styles, and the overall effect therefore depends on the relative sizes of the betas of both styles. However, the effect of risk also depends on the mean return. A high mean return acts as a buffer that reduces the importance of risk. It is therefore the scaled alpha that matters, not only a comparison of betas.

Proposition $4$ and $7$ offer interesting new possibilities for the empirical consequences of return variance. In the context of hedge funds, one can test whether high idiosyncratic variance in returns opposes the survival of that investment style, or even specific fund managers with allocations in that style. Industry practitioners often use the Sharpe ratio to select fund managers. If hedge funds truly deliver returns with low correlation to the broader markets, a high Sharpe ratio would directly correspond to low idiosyncratic return variance, consistent with the implications of our model.

Moreover, the effect of the variance of the common component depends on each strategy’s scaled alpha. The variance of the common component of two investment styles in general corresponds to the volatility of broader factors such as the market portfolio. This implies that during volatile times, investors with higher scaled alpha tend to flourish. This is directly testable in both individual investment strategies and hedge funds. For example, one can compare the frequency of investors in value versus growth strategies, momentum versus defensive, and so on, during periods of high and low market volatility, and test whether high market volatility promotes survival of those types that invest heavily in styles with high scaled alpha. With hedge fund data, one can study the attrition rates of different investment styles through different market cycles, testing the similar hypothesis that high market volatility promotes hedge fund categories with high scaled alpha.

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$^{18}$In Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden (2021) the opposite is true: variance promotes survival. In Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden (2021), this effect is driven by a selection bias whereby high returns are more likely to be reported, which is intensified by high variances. The model here allows for a more general distribution in the number of offspring, which results in a distinct intertemporal dynamic effect: a long-run “evolutionary hedging” benefit to avoid very low reproduction outcomes.
Propositions 5–7 together thus give a complete picture of the comparative statics of the equilibrium philosophy $f^*$, with respect to mean returns, return betas, and return variances.

### 4.3 A Special Case

We now apply the results derived above to study a few common competing investment styles. In particular, we consider a special case in which returns are further specified by:

**Assumption 5.** Investment styles $a$ and $b$ have the same mean return, and style $a$ has a higher beta and a higher style-specific variance than style $b$:

$$
\mu_a = \mu_b; \quad \beta_a > \beta_b; \quad \text{Var}(\epsilon_a) > \text{Var}(\epsilon_b).
$$

Style $a$ has higher systematic risk and higher volatility than style $b$. This specification is suggestive of several possible real-world applications, such as active versus passive investing, or investing by high versus low income (high versus low dividend yield). Another application is the so-called defensive investing aimed at stocks with low volatility, a common smart beta strategy. For example, AQR offers funds marketed as “defensive” that are designed to focus on low volatility stocks. We will call $a$ the “riskier” style and $b$ the “safer” style.

It immediately follows that the scaled alpha is higher for style $b$:

$$
\frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} \leq \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b},
$$

and Lemma 1 reduces to:

\[
\mathbb{E}[y] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{X_a}{X_b} \right] \approx 1 + \left( \frac{\beta_a^2}{\mu_b^3} \right) \left( \frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} - \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b} \right) \text{Var}(r) + \left( \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b^3} \right) \text{Var}(\epsilon_b);
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}[1/y] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{X_b}{X_a} \right] \approx 1 + \left( \frac{\beta_a^2}{\mu_a^3} \right) \left( \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b} - \frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} \right) \text{Var}(r) + \left( \frac{\mu_b}{\mu_a^3} \right) \text{Var}(\epsilon_a) > 1.
\]

Up to a second-order Taylor approximation, $\mathbb{E}[1/y]$ is always greater than 1, which implies that style $a$ alone is never an equilibrium. The long-run equilibrium philosophy is either purely style $b$ (with a higher scaled alpha), or a combination of both investment styles, in which case the first-order condition for $f$ in Lemma 2 reduces to:

$$
0 = [f \beta_a + (1 - f) \beta_b] \left( \beta_b - \beta_a \right) \text{Var}(r) + (1 - f) \text{Var}(\epsilon_b) - f \text{Var}(\epsilon_a),
$$

from which the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy $f^*$ can be solved. We summarize these observations as follows:
Proposition 8. Under Assumptions 1–5, up to a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to $r$, $\epsilon_a$ and $\epsilon_b$, style $a$ alone is never an evolutionary equilibrium. Style $b$ alone is evolutionary equilibrium if

$$\text{Var}(\epsilon_b) < \beta_b(\beta_a - \beta_b)\text{Var}(r).$$

Otherwise the population consists of investors in both styles in the long run, and the equilibrium fraction of investors in style $a$ is given by:

$$f^* = \frac{\text{Var}(\epsilon_b) - \beta_b(\beta_a - \beta_b)\text{Var}(r)}{\text{Var}(\epsilon_a) + \text{Var}(\epsilon_b) + (\beta_a - \beta_b)^2\text{Var}(r)}.$$  \hfill (12)

It is evident from Proposition 8 that the population tends to have only investors in style $b$ when the common component has a high volatility ($\text{Var}(r)$), the safer style has a low volatility ($\text{Var}(\epsilon_b)$), and the riskier style has a high beta ($\beta_a$). In the case that the population consists of investors in both styles, the fraction of investors in style $a$ increases as the variance of the $a$-specific component ($\text{Var}(\epsilon_a)$) decreases, the variance of the $b$-specific component ($\text{Var}(\epsilon_b)$) increases, and the variance of the common component ($\text{Var}(r)$) decreases. This is consistent with our earlier discussions indicating that risk tends to reduce the evolutionary success of a style.

When comparing the riskier style and the safer style, Proposition 8 implies that the riskier style alone is never optimal. A certain amount of allocation in the safer style is always desirable. It also implies that allocation in the riskier style tend to increase in stable environments and decrease in volatile markets.

5 General Replication Rules

In our basic model, we have assumed that the replication rule, i.e., the mapping from the gross returns $X_a$ and $X_b$ to the number of offspring is an identity function (see Assumption 3). Here we consider a general class of replication rules and assess the robustness of the results we derived so far.

5.1 General Replication Function and Equilibrium Philosophy

We first generalize Assumption 3 to allow for a much more general class of replication rules.

Assumption 6. The number of offspring generated by the investment style $a$ or $b$ is given by $\psi(X_a)$ or $\psi(X_b)$, where $\psi(\cdot)$ is a replication function that is twice differentiable, non-negative,
non-decreasing, and concave:
\[ \psi \geq 0, \quad \psi' \geq 0, \quad \psi'' \leq 0. \]

Assumption 6 reflects a few natural conditions for any reasonable evolutionary process. \( \psi \geq 0 \) guarantees that the number of offspring is non-negative. \( \psi' \geq 0 \) guarantees that higher returns are preferred and therefore do not lead to fewer followers. \( \psi'' \leq 0 \) corresponds to a diminishing marginal effect of return-biased transmission—an increase in returns from 1% to 2% is more influential than that from 10% to 11%.

By following the same derivations in (2)–(4), it is easy to show that the average log population for philosophy \( f \) satisfies:
\[
\frac{1}{T} \log n_T \xrightarrow{a.s.} \mathbb{E}[\log (f \psi(X_a) + (1-f) \psi(X_b))] \equiv \alpha_\psi(f)
\]
as \( T \) increases without bound. We add the subscript “\( \psi \)” to the population growth rate \( \alpha_\psi(f) \), which emphasizes the fact that \( \psi \) determines the growth rate, and therefore, the optimal investment philosophy. The optimal \( f \) that maximizes (13) is given by:

**Proposition 9.** Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 6, the growth-optimal type \( f_\psi^* \) that maximizes (13) is:

\[
f_\psi^* = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\psi(X_b)}{\psi(X_a)} \right] < 1 \\
\text{solution to (15)} & \text{if } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\psi(X_a)}{\psi(X_b)} \right] \geq 1 \text{ and } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\psi(X_b)}{\psi(X_a)} \right] \geq 1 \\
0 & \text{if } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\psi(X_a)}{\psi(X_b)} \right] < 1,
\end{cases}
\]

where \( f_\psi^* \) is defined implicitly in the second case of (14) by:
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\psi(X_a) - \psi(X_b)}{f_\psi^* \psi(X_a) + (1-f_\psi^*)\psi(X_b)} \right] = 0
\]

and the expectations in (14)-(15) are with respect to the joint distribution \( \Phi(X_a, X_b) \).

We can derive a parallel set of comparative statics results for the growth-optimal philosophy \( f_\psi^* \) with respect to return characteristics. In general, the results in Propositions 2–7 are robust to general replication functions \( \psi \), though in certain cases, explicit characterizations of boundary conditions are no longer possible in terms of simple expressions of \( \mu \) and \( \beta \). The derivations are quite complicated analytically, so we summarize the key conclusions here and leave the mathematical details to the proofs in Appendix C.
5.2 Single Dominant Style

We first provide comparative statics results for single dominant rules, i.e., when \( f^* \psi \) is either 0 or 1.

**Proposition 10** (Comparative Statics for Single Dominant Rules under General Replica-

\[ \text{Proposition 10 (Comparative Statics for Single Dominant Rules under General Replication Functions). Under Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 6, style } a \text{-investors tend to dominate the population if:} \]

(i) (a) the mean return of style a, \( \mu_a \), increases;
   (b) the mean return of style b, \( \mu_b \), decreases.

(ii) (a) \( \beta_b \) increases;
   (b) \( \beta_a \) increases, conditional on style a’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha being sufficiently greater than style b’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha:
   \[
   \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} > C_1;
   \]
   (c) \( \beta_a \) decreases, conditional on style a’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha being sufficiently small relative to style b’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha:
   \[
   \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} < C_1;
   \]

(iii) (a) the variance of style-specific component for a, \( \text{Var}(\epsilon_a) \), decreases;
   (b) the variance of the common component, \( \text{Var}(r) \), increases, conditional on style a’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha being sufficiently greater than style b’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha:
   \[
   \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} > C_2;
   \]
   (c) the variance of the common component, \( \text{Var}(r) \), decreases, conditional on style a’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha being sufficiently small relative to style b’s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha:
   \[
   \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} < C_2.
   \]

The conditions in (ii)–(iii) hold up to second-order Taylor approximation with respect to \( r, \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \). \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) are given in the proof in Appendix C.

In Proposition 10, case (i) generalizes Proposition 2, case (ii) generalizes Proposition 3, and case (iii) generalizes Proposition 4.
5.3 Diverse Investment Styles

The next result provides comparative statics when the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy involves both investment styles.

**Proposition 11** (Comparative Statics for Diversity under General Replication Functions). Under Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 6 when the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy has mixed investment styles, the equilibrium philosophy \( f^* \) increases when:

(i) (a) the mean return of style \( a \), \( \mu_a \), increases;
(b) the mean return of style \( b \), \( \mu_b \), decreases.

(ii) (a) \( \beta_a \) increases, if \( \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} > C_3 \);
(b) \( \beta_a \) decreases, if \( \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} < C_3 \);
(c) \( \beta_b \) decreases, if \( \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} > C_3'' \);
(d) \( \beta_b \) increases, if \( \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} < C_3'' \).

(iii) (a) the variance of style-specific component for \( a \), \( \text{Var}(\epsilon_a) \), decreases;
(b) the variance of style-specific component for \( b \), \( \text{Var}(\epsilon_b) \), increases;
(c) the variance of the common component, \( \text{Var}(r) \), increases, conditional on style \( a \)'s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha being sufficiently greater than style \( b \)'s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha:
\[
\frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} > C_4;
\]
(d) the variance of the common component, \( \text{Var}(r) \), decreases, conditional on style \( a \)'s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha being sufficiently small relative to style \( b \)'s \( \psi \)-scaled alpha:
\[
\frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} < C_4.
\]

The conditions in (ii)–(iii) hold up to second-order Taylor approximation with respect to \( r \), \( \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \). \( C_3, C_3'', \) and \( C_4 \) are given in the proof in Appendix C.

In Proposition 11 case (i) generalizes Proposition 5, case (ii) generalizes Proposition 6, and case (iii) generalizes Proposition 7. Overall, Propositions 10–11 show that the equilibrium philosophy \( f^*_\psi \) has the same set of dependencies on return characteristics as those for \( f^* \), with just a different notion of \( \psi \)-scaled alpha and a different set of constants specifying boundary conditions. These results confirm that our key conclusions in Section 4 are robust to a very general class of replication rules.
6 Diversity in Market Equilibrium

So far, we have viewed the returns on investment style as exogenous (Assumption 4). However, in market equilibrium, stock returns reflect shifts in supply and demand as the frequencies of different investment styles shift. Here we extend the model to reflect the fact that the imbalance between supply and demand for the securities traded by styles $a$ and $b$ affects their expected returns. In particular, we build a general equilibrium model with endogenous returns and study its implications for the equilibrium investment philosophy.

6.1 A General Equilibrium Model

Fundamental value vs actual price. We start by making a distinction between the fundamental value and the actual price of style $a$ and $b$. We interpret $X_{at}$ and $X_{bt}$ defined in Assumption 4 as gross returns to the fundamental value processes of style $a$ and $b$. We use $\tilde{P}_{a,t}$ and $\tilde{P}_{b,t}$ to denote the corresponding fundamental values, which are given by:

\begin{align*}
\tilde{P}_{a,t} &= X_{at} \cdot \tilde{P}_{a,t-1}, \\
\tilde{P}_{b,t} &= X_{bt} \cdot \tilde{P}_{b,t-1}.
\end{align*}

(16)

On the other hand, the actual prices, $P_{a,t}$ and $P_{b,t}$, may deviate from fundamental values due to forces of supply and demand in the market. They are related to the actual returns, $R_{at}$ and $R_{bt}$, by:

\begin{align*}
P_{a,t} &= R_{at} \cdot P_{a,t-1}, \\
P_{b,t} &= R_{bt} \cdot P_{b,t-1}.
\end{align*}

(17)

The distinction between fundamental value and actual price follows the classical work of Lux (1995), who built a model of herd behavior in speculative markets in which the demand for a single asset is determined by deviations of its price from the fundamental value.\[19\]

\[19\]It is worth noting that many models in this literature start with an exogenous stochastic dividend process, and solve for equilibrium prices given a certain class of beliefs or investment strategies. See, for example, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007), Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe (2006, 2008), Bottazzi and Dindo (2014), Bottazzi, Dindo, and Giachini (2018). In our model, we are particularly interested in the relationship between survival and asset return characteristics such as mean returns, betas, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, it is more appropriate in our case to start with a factor model of the value (or return) rather than the cashflow (or dividend). After all, the cashflow determines the value and the two approaches are similar in this sense. Therefore, it is not surprising that these models share certain common elements. For example, in Brock and Hommes (1998), heterogeneous beliefs are assumed to be functions of past deviations from the fundamental.
Demand, supply, and market clearing. Let $U = \{0, \frac{1}{K}, \frac{2}{K}, \ldots, 1\} = \{f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_{K+1}\}$ be a discrete universe that consists of $K + 1$ types of investors. Let $q_t^f$ be the frequency of type-$f$ investors in the population in period $t$:

$$q_t^f = \frac{n_t^f}{\sum_{g \in U} n_t^g},$$

(18)

so that the frequencies of all types of investors sum to one. Let the aggregate demand in style $a$ in period $t$ be the frequency-weighted average investment philosophy in the population:

$$\lambda_t = \sum_{f \in U} f q_t^f.$$  

(19)

By definition, the aggregate demand begins at 0.5, and evolves to a value between zero and one as the two investment styles generate different returns.

Following the literature on heterogeneous agent models and noise traders (Lux 1995, 2009; Chiarella, Dieci, and He 2009; Hommes and Wagener 2009), we make a distinction between speculators and fundamentalists in the market. Speculators refer to investors we have considered so far, and their intertemporal dynamics follow the return-biased transmission. Given actual prices, the dollar demand from speculators in the market for asset $a$ and asset $b$ are $W_S \lambda_t$ and $W_S (1 - \lambda_t)$, where $W_S$ is the total wealth of all speculators. Therefore, the demand in shares is:

$$D_{a,t} = \frac{W_S \lambda_t}{P_{a,t}}, \quad D_{b,t} = \frac{W_S (1 - \lambda_t)}{P_{b,t}}.$$  

(20)

On the other hand, a second group of traders, the fundamentalists, offer supply in the market. Their supply is determined by the difference between the fundamental value and actual price:

$$S_{a,t} = \frac{W_F \left( P_{a,t}/\bar{P}_{a,t} \right)^k}{P_{a,t}}, \quad S_{b,t} = \frac{W_F \left( P_{b,t}/\bar{P}_{b,t} \right)^k}{P_{b,t}},$$  

(21)

where $W_F$ represents the total wealth from the fundamentalists, $\left( P_{a,t}/\bar{P}_{a,t} \right)^k$ and $\left( P_{b,t}/\bar{P}_{b,t} \right)^k$ represent the dollar supply for asset $a$ and $b$, and $k > 0$ is a constant measuring the elasticity/sensitivity of supply with respect to deviations from the fundamental value. A higher

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20In this sense, the fundamentalists can also be regarded as market makers to meet the demand. An alternative interpretation is that the fundamentalists are also generating demand in the market together with the speculators. The aggregate demand is met by a constant one unit of supply. This is the actual specification by Lux (1995) which is equivalent to our specification here.
value of \( k \) corresponds to a higher sensitivity from fundamentalists in response to such deviations\footnote{We choose the specification in \cite{21} because it allows us to derive analytical results explicitly. Alternative specifications are possible as long as the supply depends on deviations from the fundamental value.}

When the market clears, supply must equal demand. Therefore we have:

\[
D_{a,t} = S_{a,t} \implies \frac{W_S \lambda_t}{P_{a,t}} = \frac{W_F \left( P_{a,t}/\tilde{P}_{a,t} \right)^k}{P_{a,t}},
\]

\[
D_{b,t} = S_{b,t} \implies \frac{W_S (1 - \lambda_t)}{P_{b,t}} = \frac{W_F \left( P_{b,t}/\tilde{P}_{b,t} \right)^k}{P_{b,t}}.
\]

Price fluctuations are caused by the endogenous mechanism relating the fraction of investors choosing style \( a \) to the distance between the fundamental value and actual price\footnote{In addition, the relative wealth between the speculators and fundamentalists, \( W_S \) and \( W_F \), can also be modeled, and one can study the survival of speculators (noise traders) versus fundamentalists, and their impact on asset prices. However, the survival of noise traders has been extensively studied and is not the focus of our paper (see, for example, De Long et al. \cite{1990, 1991}, Kyle and Wang \cite{1997}, Hirshleifer and Luo \cite{2001}, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman \cite{2006}, Yan \cite{2008}, Kogan et al. \cite{2006, 2017}). Therefore we take a simpler route to hold the fraction of speculators versus fundamentalists constant, which is enough to model the dependence of endogenous prices on demand fluctuations for style \( a \) and \( b \).}

### 6.2 Price, Return, and Philosophy in Equilibrium

**Equilibrium prices and returns.** Solving for market clearing conditions, \cite{22}, we have the following result for the equilibrium prices and returns.

**Proposition 12.** In the market equilibrium model, the endogenous equilibrium prices are given by:

\[
P_{a,t} = \tilde{P}_{a,t} \left( \frac{W_S \lambda_t}{W_F} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}},
\]

\[
P_{b,t} = \tilde{P}_{b,t} \left( \frac{W_S (1 - \lambda_t)}{W_F} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}},
\]

and the endogenous equilibrium returns are given by:

\[
R_{a,t} = X_{a,t} \left( \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}},
\]

\[
R_{b,t} = X_{b,t} \left( \frac{1 - \lambda_t}{1 - \lambda_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}}.
\]
There are several interesting observations that can be made from Proposition 12. First, the aggregate demand ($\lambda_t$) determines the equilibrium prices and their deviations from the fundamental value, while it is the change in aggregate demand between two periods ($\lambda_t/\lambda_{t-1}$) that determines the equilibrium returns. For example, as style $a$ generates higher returns, investors with higher $f$ will generate more offspring in the next period, driving the aggregate demand in style $a$ higher. As a result, we expect the cost of purchasing style $a$ securities to increase, which reduces the return for buying and holding style $a$.

Second, the equilibrium prices are affected by the fraction of speculators versus fundamentalists in the market ($W_F/W_S$). Because our model does not focus on how this fraction changes over time, the price dynamics is mainly driven by the relative demand ($\lambda_t$).

Third, the exponent $1/k$ describes the shape of a power-law market impact from trading, which is the reciprocal of the sensitivity to price deviations by the fundamentalists. Higher sensitivities lead to milder price impact and lower sensitivities lead to stronger price impact. This is closely related to Kyle’s (1985) market microstructure model in which liquidity is measured by an estimate of the log-volume required to move the price by one dollar.

Finally, if we consider price deviations from the fundamental value:

$$
\frac{P_{a,t}}{\tilde{P}_{a,t}} = \left(\frac{W_S \lambda_t}{W_F}\right)^{\frac{1}{k}},
$$

$$
\frac{P_{b,t}}{\tilde{P}_{b,t}} = \left(\frac{W_S (1 - \lambda_t)}{W_F}\right)^{\frac{1}{k}},
$$

our model implies that higher demand in a style ($\lambda_t$) leads to a higher degree of price deviation (bubble), and a higher level of supply sensitivity ($k$) makes it harder to substantially deviate from the fundamental values, or less likely to form bubble.

**Equilibrium philosophy with endogenous returns.** Given the endogenous returns in Proposition 12 we denote an equilibrium philosophy by $f^e$, with superscript $e$ indicating endogenous returns.

**Proposition 13.** Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 and the endogenous returns given by the market clearing conditions, (22)–(24), the equilibrium philosophy $f^e$ that maximizes the investor’s growth as $T$ increases without bound is identical to $f^*$ in Proposition 7 under the simple replication rule given by Assumption 3, and to $f^*_\psi$ in Proposition 9 under the general replication rule given by Assumption 6.23

23See also Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Lillo, Farmer, and Mantegna (2003), and Almgren et al. (2005) for more detailed explorations of the power law of price impact in equity markets.
Proposition 13 shows that though asset prices are affected in the long run by the relative demand in style $a$ to style $b$, the equilibrium philosophy remains the same. In other words, our results in Propositions 2–11 remain robust in a model of market equilibrium. This is not surprising given our remarks after Proposition 12. Indeed, equilibrium prices are affected by the aggregate demand in the long run. However, the equilibrium returns, \( (24) \), are determined by two terms—the returns on the fundamental value, and an adjustment term that depends on the change in demand between two periods. In equilibrium, the second term vanishes to a constant one.

Next, we provide two simulation examples to further demonstrate the effect of market equilibrium.

### 6.3 Simulation Examples

We consider a log-linear specification for the fundamental value process in simulation, which is slightly different from the linear specification in Assumption\[4\]. The linear specification allows us to derive simple closed-form results that highlight the central economic implications in our theory. On the other hand, the log-linear specification is convenient in practice because it models $X_a$ and $X_b$ as lognormal distributions, and therefore guarantees that the prices (cumulative returns) do not go negative. The same strategy is also used by Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007). The fundamental values of the two styles are given by:

\[
X_a = \exp(\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a - 1), \\
X_b = \exp(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b - 1),
\]

where

\[
\mu_a = \mu_b = 1, \quad \beta_a = 2, \quad \beta_b = 0.1, \\
r \sim N(0, 0.1^2), \quad \epsilon_a \sim N(0, 0.3^2), \quad \epsilon_b \sim N(0, 0.1^2),
\]

and $N$ denotes the normal distribution. We also set $k = 1$, $W_S = 2$, and $W_F = 1$ without loss of generality.

Figure 2 demonstrates a market in which prices are determined endogenously, with five philosophies \((f = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1)\) over 5,000 generations. Figures 2a–2b focuses on the first 50 generations, and show the (log)-endogenous price, the (log)-fundamental value, and the price-to-fundamental ratio, respectively. Prices fluctuate around the fundamental value. Style $a$ is over-priced in this period due to its high demand initially. Figure 2c shows the evolution of five philosophies \((f = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1)\) over 5,000 generations, in which the
vertical axis denotes the frequency of each type of investor in the population. $f = 1.0$ is popular for a short period of time in the very beginning, consistent with the fact that style $a$ is over-priced in Figures 2a–2b. After that, the equilibrium philosophy $f^* = 0.5$ quickly dominates the population. Finally, Figure 2d shows the price-to-fundamental ratio over the entire course of the evolution. After an extended period of fluctuations, the ratio eventually converges to one. In reality, the market conditions are constantly changing. Instead of the long-run limit, the short-term oscillation shown here may be typical of the market.

![Diagram](image1)

(a) Price and Fundamental (First 50 Gen)  
(b) Price-to-Fundamental (First 50 Gen)

![Diagram](image2)

(c) Philosophy Evolution  
(d) Price-to-Fundamental

Figure 2: A demonstration of market equilibrium in which prices and returns are determined endogenously. (2a) and (2b) show the fundamental value, price, and price-to-fundamental ratio over the first 50 generations in evolution. (2c) and (2d) show the equilibrium philosophy $f^e$ and the price-to-fundamental ratio over 5,000 generations.

In a slightly different simulation experiment, we increase the mean return of style $a$ so that in equilibrium $f^e = 1$ is the dominant behavior:

$$
\begin{align*}
\mu_a &= 1.1, & \mu_b &= 1, & \beta_a &= 2, & \beta_b &= 0.1, \\
r &\sim N(0, 0.1^2), & \epsilon_a &\sim N(0, 0.3^2), & \epsilon_b &\sim N(0, 0.1^2),
\end{align*}
$$

(28)
where \( N \) denotes the normal distribution. We also set \( k = 0.3, W_S = 1.2, \) and \( W_F = 1. \)

Figure 3 shows that market equilibrium prices may speed up the rate of convergence, by comparing the evolution of the same five philosophies \( (f = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) \) when returns are exogenously determined by the fundamental value (Figure 3a), and when returns are endogenously determined by market equilibrium (Figure 3b). In the former, the market still contains multiple philosophies after 100 generations, while in the latter, \( f^e = 1.0 \) dominates the population after around 50 generations.

This phenomenon can be understood by the expression of equilibrium returns in (24). When the aggregate demand is, for example, increasing for style \( a \), market equilibrium forces further enhance the returns for that style. In this sense, market equilibrium serves as momentum for style returns, thereby helping the dominant style to dominate faster. The same mechanism is also adopted in the computer science literature for optimizing the loss function of deep neural networks.\(^{24}\)

![Figure 3: Market equilibrium speeds up the rate of convergence. The evolution of the equilibrium philosophy \( f^* \) with exogenous returns (3a) and the equilibrium philosophy \( f^e \) with endogenous returns (3b) are shown over 100 generations.](image)

7 Psychological Bias and Investment Philosophies

We have assumed so far that investors are only influenced by the observed payoffs. In reality, investors may also be persuaded to adopt an investment philosophy based upon whether someone else has adopted it. In this section, we discuss two such psychological effects: the conformist preference and attention to novelty.\(^{25}\)

\(^{24}\)See, for example, the adaptive momentum (Adam) algorithm (Kingma and Ba, 2015).

\(^{25}\)Similar psychological factors in which investors' choices depend mainly on the behavior and expectation of others have been considered in the literature (see, for example, Lux (1995) and Pedersen (2022)). The key
7.1 Conformist Preference

Investors may have conformist preferences (Klick and Parisi 2008), perhaps through a mechanism of viewing other investors as being better informed, and therefore will be influenced by the choices of others. We generalize the population dynamics between two generations in (1) to capture this effect:

\[ X_{i,t}^f = \left[ I_{i,t}^f X_{at} + (1 - I_{i,t}^f)X_{bt} \right] \exp \left[ \tau(f - \lambda_{t-1})^2 \right], \tag{29} \]

where \( \lambda_{t-1} \) is the average philosophy in the population in the previous generation \( t - 1 \), and \( \tau \leq 0 \) is the intensity of conformity pressure. When \( \tau = 0 \), (29) reduces to (1). When \( \tau < 0 \), the further \( f \) is away from the average philosophy \( \lambda_{t-1} \), the more intense is the conformity pressure.

By a similar derivation as (3), the population size of type-\( f \) investors in period \( T \) is:

\[ n_T^f = \prod_{t=1}^{T} [fX_{at} + (1 - f)X_{bt}] \exp \left[ \tau(f - \lambda_{t-1})^2 \right] \]

\[ = \exp \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \log [fX_{at} + (1 - f)X_{bt}] + \tau \sum_{t=1}^{T} (f - \lambda_{t-1})^2 \right\}. \]

Taking the logarithm of the number of offspring, we have:

\[ \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \log n_T^f = E[\log (fX_a + (1 - f)X_b)] + \tau \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (f - \lambda_{t-1})^2, \tag{30} \]

where the first term is simply the log-geometric average growth rate of the population without conformity pressure, \( \alpha(f) \), in (4). From (29) and (30), we can see that the magnitude of the conformity pressure \( \tau \) acts roughly as a multiplicative factor in the fitness, or an additive factor in the population growth rate\(^{26}\).

Suppose a long time has passed, and the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy \( f^* \) that maximizes \( \alpha(f) \) without conformity pressure has dominated the population. The investment philosophy \( f^* \) is evolutionarily stable because any other philosophy grows even more slowly than \( f^* \) with a negative conformity pressure term. However, if \( f^* \) is not initially popular, it may never grow. We verify this implication in the simulation below.

\(^{26}\)However, we cannot apply the Law of Large Numbers to the second term of (30) in general to get an explicit solution in the limit because \( \lambda_{t-1} \) is nonstationary.
Conformist pressure reduces the rate of convergence. We show through a simulated experiment that conformist preference acts as an inertial term that slows down convergence, and in some extreme cases, is even able to change the survival philosophy. We simulate the evolution of 11 philosophies in \( \{0, 0.1, \cdots, 1\} \) in a market in which investment returns are given by the same specification, (26)–(28), as the simulation example of the market equilibrium. Without any conformity pressure, the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy is \( f^e = 0.5 \) for endogenous returns.

Figure 4 shows the evolution of philosophies \( f \in \{0, 0.1, \cdots, 1\} \) over 20,000 generations. The initial population is composed of 90\% \( f = 0 \), and 1\% of each \( f \in \{0.1, 0.2, \cdots, 1\} \). Figures 4a–4b represent the case of no conformity pressure, showing that \( f = 0.5 \) quickly dominates the population. The price-to-fundamental ratio stays fairly close to one after an initial period of fluctuations.

On the other hand, Figures 4c–4f use different levels of conformity pressure. In the process of convergence to \( f = 0.5 \), other philosophies are popular for extended periods of time. This process may appear as cycles of different popular investment philosophies. Within each period, a certain philosophy is so prevalent in the population that the price-to-fundamental ratios are materially affected, resulting in over-pricing for style a and under-pricing for style b. In fact, the popular philosophy in one period could potentially create a long streak of high returns as more investors adopt it, but as the popular philosophy changes, investors holding the previously popular philosophy will quickly be wiped out.

In this example, the initial average philosophy in the population is close to 0, and therefore, philosophies with low \( f \) will grow more quickly due to the conformity effect. Over time, as the average philosophy \( \lambda_t \) grows larger, other philosophies start to grow in response. The conformity pressure enhances the survival of the popular philosophy at the time, and inhibits the growth of other philosophies.

In our example, the ultimately dominant philosophy has the chance to grow because our simulation begins with a large enough population such that it is never wiped out completely. In reality, philosophies like \( f = 0.5 \) might be eliminated quickly due to conformity pressure. From the evolutionary perspective, mutation would act as insurance for all philosophies to have a chance to grow (see Appendix B).

Empirical tests for conformist preference could be performed by examining groups with different degrees of conformity pressure, and correlating them with the degree of market efficiency or the speed of convergence after large market shocks. The degree of conformity pressure is likely to be difficult and noisy to measure, but in principle, it can be inferred from textual analysis of social media, or proxies such as the level of adoption of financial innovation (a low amount of innovation might suggest a high degree of conformist preference).
Figure 4: Conformist pressure slows down the rate of convergence. Evolution of philosophies $f \in \{0, 0.1, \cdots, 1\}$ and its corresponding price-to-fundamental ratio over 5000 generations with the environment (style payoffs) specified in (26)–(28). (4a)–(4b) represent no conformity pressure. (4c)–(4f) represent conformity pressures with $\tau = -0.1$ and $\tau = -0.2$. 
7.2 Attention to Novelty

Opposite in effect to conformist preference is attention to novelty. In attention to novelty, investors are more likely to pay attention to an investment philosophy if it is substantially different from the most popular ones. We modify the population dynamics between two generations in (29) in the following way:

\[
X_{i,t}^f = \left[ I_{i,t}^f X_{at} + (1 - I_{i,t}^f) X_{bt} \right] \cdot \exp \left[ \rho (1 - q_{i,t}^f) \right],
\]

(31)

where \( q_{i,t}^f \) is the population frequency of type-\( f \) investors in generation \( t - 1 \), defined in (18). Here, \( \rho \geq 0 \) represents the degree of attention to novelty. A higher \( q_{i,t}^f \) leads to a greater fitness boost due to the attention to novelty.

Similar to the case of conformity, the logarithm of the population size is:

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \log n_T^f = \mathbb{E} \left[ \log \left( f X_a + (1 - f) X_b \right) \right] + \rho \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (1 - q_{i,t-1}^f),
\]

(32)

where the first term is again the log-geometric average growth rate of the population without attention to novelty, \( \alpha(f) \), in (4). Suppose a long time has passed, and that a philosophy almost dominates the population. The second term in (32) is close to 0 for that philosophy, while other philosophies receive a fitness boost due to the attention to novelty, and may tend to outgrow the currently popular philosophy. Therefore, it is hard for any single philosophy to dominate in the long run. We show this effect in the following simulation experiments.

Attention to novelty adds diversity and leads to “bubbles”. We next show that attention to novelty can both add diversity and induce bubbles in market evolution. The existence of bubbles, the mechanism through which they form, and the predictability of their formation and collapse have been an active area of research in recent years (Shiller, 2000; Fama, 2014; Greenwood, Shleifer, and You, 2019). Our simulation below provides a potential mechanism for the formation of bubbles within our model.

We again simulate the evolution of 11 philosophies in \( \{0, 0.1, \cdots, 1\} \) in a market in which

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27One way to model attention to novelty is simply to set \( \tau \) to be positive in (29). However, it is not satisfactory in some corner cases. For example, imagine the population consists mostly of investors with \( f = 0 \) (e.g. a growth philosophy) and \( f = 1 \) (e.g. a value philosophy). A specification as in (29) would imply that the average philosophy in the population is \( f = 0.5 \), and any philosophy far from 0.5 is novel. However, \( f = 0.5 \) (a mix of growth and value) is actually novel in this example because everyone in the population only employs either a pure growth or a pure value philosophy.

28We cannot apply the Law of Large Numbers to the second term in general to get an explicit solution in the limit because \( q_{i,t-1}^f \) is nonstationary.
investment returns are given by the same specification, (26)–(28), as the simulation example of the market equilibrium. Without any attention to novelty, the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy is \( f^e = 0.5 \) for endogenous returns.

Figure 5 shows the simulation paths for different degrees of attention to novelty. Figures (5a)–(5b) shows the case \( \rho = 0 \), which corresponds to no attention to novelty, and we can see that \( f = 0.5 \) eventually dominates the population. As the degree of attention to novelty increases to 0.1 in Figure (5c), \( f = 0.5 \) no longer dominates the population. Higher degrees of attention to novelty lead to a greater mix in investment philosophies. In the long run, there does not exist a single dominant philosophy, because other philosophies are novel compared to the most popular current philosophy, despite their lower fitness (i.e., payoff), and therefore receive a disproportionate conversion in evolution.

In addition, Figure 5d shows the price-to-fundamental ratio when attention to novelty is set to 0.1. The two investment styles experience repeated episodes of over-pricing and under-pricing. These patterns of investor composition and asset price dynamics are similar to the bubbles and crashes generated from models of herding (e.g. Lux (1995); Chinco (2022)), as well as return cycles and volatilities generated from learning in markets with multivariate models (e.g. Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007)). Our results provide an alternative channel—attention to novelty—through which such phenomenon can occur.

Finally, we consider a variation of the mechanism specified in (31), by allowing the definition of novelty to include memory. In particular, we replace the term \( q_{t-1}^f \) in (31) by:

\[
\bar{q}_{t-1}^f = q_{t-2}^f \times \text{decay} + q_{t-1}^f \times (1 - \text{decay}).
\]

This modified specification captures the fact that investors may view a particular philosophy as novel not just because it has not appeared in the last period, but because it has not appeared for a long time. Here decay is a parameter controlling the length of the memory, which we set to 0.9999 in our simulation.

Figures 5e–5f demonstrate the evolution of philosophies as well as the price-to-fundamental ratios. With memory, it is even more clear that the population experienced multiple cycles in which popular philosophies alternate. In terms of the equilibrium prices, style \( b \) experienced a sharp increase in price in the beginning, leading to a bubble, which slowly bursts over the course of the evolution. Towards the end of our simulation, it appears that style \( b \) is quickly picking up on another potential bubble again. This example further demonstrates that the speed of bubble formation and bursts can be affected by the length of investors’ memory.

Empirical tests for the effects of attention to novelty are possible using proxies for attention that have been applied in the empirical finance literature (see, for example, Barber...
Figure 5: Evolution of philosophies $f \in \{0, 0.1, \ldots, 1\}$ over 5000 generations with the environment (style payoffs) specified in Section 6.3. (5a)-(5b) represent no attention to novelty. (5c)-(5f) represents different degrees of attention to novelty.
and Odean (2007), Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), and Li and Yu (2012). Henderson and Pearson (2011) find evidence that firms issue certain retail structured equity products with negative expected returns, potentially shrouding some aspects of securities innovation or introducing complexity to attract attention, therefore exploiting uninformed investors. This suggests that some investors do invest based on attention to novelty even if the financial security might not deliver desirable returns, which is consistent with our assumptions.

7.3 Tradeoffs in Social Learning

Conformist preference and attention to novelty have opposite effects in social learning: one promotes learning from other people and bets on the “wisdom of crowds”, while the other encourages novel and contrarian ideas.

When the degree of conformist preference is extreme, we have seen that the convergence to the long-run equilibrium investment philosophy can be greatly delayed (see Figure 4). This is not surprising, as the “wisdom of crowds” only works under the assumption that individuals have different information sources and relatively independent decision-making processes. If this condition is violated, the “effective population size” (to borrow a term from population genetics) is greatly reduced, and crowds may have little wisdom.

On the other extreme, when the degree of attention to novelty is high, investment philosophies that work well in the current environment have a weaker influence on the adoption of philosophies in the future. Investors no longer use the information from past returns embedded in the population frequencies. As a result, no one benefits from the “wisdom of crowds”, which can lead to bubbles and bursts (see Figure 5).

In practice, an intermediate amount of social learning is probably most desirable from the perspective of adopting the fittest philosophy in the current environment. For example, studies on interactions between financial traders have documented a large range of rates of idea flow, from isolated individual traders at one end to traders trapped in an echo chamber at the other end, finding that the best investment performance is achieved between the two extremes (Altshuler, Pan, and Pentland 2012; Pan, Altshuler, and Pentland 2012).

8 Directions for Empirical Testing

We have discussed several empirically testable implications of our analysis. For example, Propositions 2–13 provide relationships between the evolutionary equilibrium investment philosophy \( f^* \) and the return characteristics of investment styles \( a \) and \( b \), including their mean, variance, and beta.
8.1 Summary of Empirical Implications

Here we summarize the key empirical implications of our model. The survival of an investment style or a fund is jointly determined by several elements, including its expected return, beta, and volatility. In particular, the scaled alpha—defined as the expected gross return of a style divided by its beta—plays a critical role.

Expected return-related implications.

Prediction 1. A fund with higher expected return tends to attract more investors after controlling for other factors such as beta and volatility.

See Propositions 2 and 5.

Beta-related implications.

Prediction 2. A fund with lower beta tends to attract more investors when its scaled alpha is comparable with alternative funds, and a fund with higher beta tends to attract more investors when its scaled alpha is much higher than alternative funds, both after controlling for other factors such as expected return and volatility.

See Propositions 3 and 6.

Prediction 3. The “beta puzzle” (stocks with high beta earn low expected return) tends to occur when market volatility is low.

According to Propositions 4 and 7, stocks with high beta and low expected return have low scaled alphas, which gains popularity when the variance of the common component, \( Var(r) \), decreases. This drives down the returns for stocks with high beta relative to stocks with low beta.

Variance-related implications.

Prediction 4. A fund with higher idiosyncratic volatility tends to lose investors, and a fund with lower idiosyncratic volatility tends to attract investors, both after controlling for other factors such as expected return, beta, and market volatility.

See Propositions 4 and 7.

---

Prediction 5. In volatile markets, investors tend to allocate to stocks and funds with higher scaled alphas. A high scaled alpha can therefore be understood as a defensive characteristic of a fund.

See Propositions 4 and 7.

Prediction 6. The “idiosyncratic volatility puzzle” (stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn low expected return) tends to occur for stocks with high scaled alpha when market volatility is high, and for stocks with low scaled alpha when market volatility is low.

Because the survival of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility and low expected return is determined by their betas and the market volatility jointly (see Lemmas 1 and 2), an increase in market volatility for stocks with high scaled alpha makes their survival more likely (see Propositions 4 and 7). The same is true when a decrease in market volatility occurs for stocks with low scaled alpha.

Psychological effects-related implications.

Prediction 7. When the degree of conformity pressure in the population is high, asset prices are more likely to deviate from their fundamental values, market efficiency tends to be lower, and the speed of convergence after large market shocks tends to be slower.

See Section 7.1.

Prediction 8. Asset bubbles and bursts are more likely to occur when the degree of attention to novelty in the population is high.

See Section 7.2.

8.2 Strategy for Empirical Testing

Empirical testing requires estimating the investment philosophy $f^*$ and the characteristics of its style returns. In this section, we will discuss several possible ways to perform empirical tests on these predictions, including estimation methods and the use of large-scale datasets.

Style Returns. The evolutionary model can be applied to various types of investment styles, taken in pairs $a$ and $b$, value versus growth styles being an example. Following the notation in Assumption 4, it is straightforward using market data to estimate the expected

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30See Ang et al. (2006, 2009)
returns, $\mu_a$ and $\mu_b$, and the market loadings, $\beta_a$ and $\beta_b$, by regressing the time series of observed style returns on market returns. In addition, one can estimate the variance of the common return component through the sample variance of the market, and estimate the variance of the idiosyncratic return component through the sample variance of the residuals from the regression.

**Population Style Proportions.** If the financial environment is stable, the investment philosophy $f^*$ corresponds to the proportion of style-$a$ investors in the population. In the example of value versus growth styles, this would correspond to the proportion of value versus growth investors in the population, which can be estimated by textual analysis of investing social media or blogging sites such as SeekingAlpha and StockTwits.\(^{31}\) For example, Cookson and Niessner (2020) studies disagreement among investors on a social media investing platform, in which users regularly express their opinions about the same stocks, and where user profile information explicitly conveys the user’s broad investment approach (such as value versus growth, or fundamental versus technical).

Another possible data source for estimating the frequencies of investors using different styles is the exchange-traded fund (ETF) market. The ETF market has grown at a feverish pace, and there are now thousands of different ETFs, each focusing on a unique investment style (Ferri, 2011; Lettau and Madhavan, 2018). This includes regional or industry-specific ETFs, such as ETFs holding stocks in developed versus developing countries, or style-specific ETFs, such as value versus momentum ETFs, or fundamentals-driven versus AI-powered ETFs. The assets under management of these ETFs provide a possible proxy for the aggregate investor frequencies in those investment styles, with inflow and outflow of assets as a proxy for change over time.

**Hedge Funds.** Hedge funds are a very fast-growing sector of the financial services industry. One of its attractions for investors is generating returns with a relatively low correlation with traditional investment asset classes. Hedge funds are also perceived by many to draw the smartest and most innovative money managers, owing to the investment flexibility and low level of regulation relative to other financial management vehicles. With relatively low barriers to entry and exit, the hedge fund sector is a highly competitive industry. Based on these unique characteristics, hedge funds are particularly suitable for the empirical study of market selection.

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\(^{31}\)Trading data alone is not fully informative about population frequencies, owing to market clearing. For example, in the case in which all investors are identical growth investors or identical value investors, there will be no trade, and the identical trading outcome is impossible to distinguish.
Two data sources are available for empirical tests in the hedge fund industry, the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index and the Lipper/TASS Hedge Fund database. The first of these tracks approximately 9,000 funds, and reflects the monthly net performance in several fund categories, such as Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, Long/Short Equity, Global Macro, and Managed Futures. The Lipper/TASS Hedge Fund database contains performance data on over 18,000 actively reporting and “graveyard” hedge funds, including their investment styles, returns, births and deaths, and assets under management.

To test the implications of Proposition 2–13 style returns can be estimated, either directly from the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index, or by sampling individual hedge funds from the Lipper/TASS Hedge Fund database following a particular investment style. The common and idiosyncratic components of the style returns can be decomposed by regressing them against common financial and macroeconomic factors (see Fung and Hsieh (2004), Hasan-hodzic and Lo (2006), and Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) for examples). Furthermore, the proportion of hedge funds engaged in each style can be tracked over time from the Lipper/TASS Hedge Fund database. Together this data would provide the information needed to test the predicted relationships between the proportion of investors who are attracted to each investment style, and return characteristics such as mean, beta, common variance, and idiosyncratic variance.

Social Networks and Psychology. With the collection of “Big Data” in the digital era, another promising financial data source is social media. Modern digital data includes information about call records, credit card transactions, and social network usage, among other recorded interactions. This data is particularly useful to measure social transmission effects such as conformist preference and attention to novelty in our model.

9 Discussion

In a cultural evolutionary model with competing investment philosophies that place different probability weights on two investment styles, we have shown that in equilibrium, the market consists of a mixed population that invests in both investment styles. This implies a wider variation of coexisting strategies than in traditional models such as the mutual fund separation theorems associated with versions of the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Merton, 1972).

\[^{32}\text{Some examples of such social media services include SeekingAlpha, StockTwits (used in Cookson and Niessner (2020) and Argarwal et al. (2018)), eToro (used in Altshuler, Pan, and Pentland (2012), Pan, Altshuler, and Pentland (2012), and Pentland (2015), and an unnamed European social trading platform used in Ammann and Schaub (2021).}\]
The survival of investment philosophies is jointly determined by several elements, including the asset’s mean return, beta, idiosyncratic volatility, and market volatility. We also derive the evolutionary equilibrium investment philosophy with respect to these return characteristics. In general, higher mean returns promote the survival of the investment style, while higher idiosyncratic volatility opposes the survival of the style, and higher common factor volatility promotes the survival of the style with higher scaled alpha, defined as the ratio of the style’s alpha to its market beta. These results are similar for both exogenous and endogenous returns.

We extend our model to allow for general replication rules between two consecutive periods, and to incorporate the impact of supply and demand on asset prices in a market equilibrium model. We find that the key implications in terms of the survival of investment philosophies with respect to return characteristics remain robust under these extensions.

Our results provide one explanation for the long-run evolutionary survival of a wide range of investment styles. For example, there is a variety of investment styles employed in the hedge fund industry with heterogeneous return characteristics (Chan et al., 2006). Specifically, hedge funds are classified into 10 different investment styles in the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund index, and 11 different investment styles in the Lipper/TASS Hedge Fund database, and there is considerable variation within each of these styles.

Our model predicts that investments with high scaled alpha tend to flourish during high volatility periods. In the context of hedge funds, this implies that the popularity and attrition rates of different investment styles will vary through different market environments, and specifically, that high market volatility will promote styles with high scaled alpha. These intuitive implications for the hedge fund industry have been documented empirically by Getmansky, Lee, and Lo (2015).

Our model also offers some possible explanations for certain puzzles about returns that are difficult to reconcile within traditional asset pricing models, leading to several directions for future empirical testing. Our model can partially explain the “beta puzzle” that high beta stocks underperform and low beta stocks outperform (Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler 2011; Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). Our model implies that strategies that invest in stocks with high beta and low expected return can survive in the long run, especially when the market volatility is low. A further testable implication is that investment styles with low betas will gain popularity only when the scaled alpha of the available styles are comparable. These, and other implications of the model, can be empirically tested.

Our model also offers a partial explanation for the “idiosyncratic volatility puzzle,” that stocks with high idiosyncratic risk earn low returns (Ang et al., 2006, 2009). In particular, in our framework investment styles that allocate to these stocks can survive in the long run,
provided they have low betas—and therefore high scaled alpha—when market volatility is high.

Finally, we extend our evolutionary model to include two types of psychological effects that affect investor receptiveness toward the investment philosophies of others. This reinforces our prediction that many competing investment styles and philosophies are able to coexist. The conformist preference slows down convergence in evolution and therefore reduces market efficiency. Attention to novelty leads to diversity in investment philosophies in the long run, and potentially may lead to oscillations and bubbles in certain financial environments. On the one hand, this suggests interesting possible empirical tests of whether higher attention metrics, as utilized in the empirical finance literature, lead to greater diversity in investment philosophies. On the other hand, because the level of investor attention is stochastically variable over time [Barber and Odean 2007, Da, Engelberg, and Gao 2011, Li and Yu 2012], this suggests that the level of diversity in the market is unlikely to be static over time.

To further explore social contagion and its implications for investment styles and investor behaviors, our model can be extended to include resource constraints (which may generate strategic interactions), autocorrelated environments (which may generate intelligent behaviors with memory), and overlapping investors operating at different frequencies, resembling high-frequency and long-term investors (which may further generate price momentum and bubbles). Our model, and more generally, the evolutionary finance approach, offers a possible framework for modeling how social contagion causes these behaviors and market phenomena.
Appendix

A Generalization for Multiple Assets with Multiple Factors

Our main model in Section 3 considers two competing investment styles whose returns share a common factor. The simplicity of this specification allows us to derive closed-form expressions that highlight many key economic insights. However, our model can be substantially generalized to include not only multiple investment choices but also multiple pricing factors, which is closer to reality. We describe this extension here.

Consider investors who choose from \( m \) investment styles (or assets), \( \{1, \cdots, m\} \), and this results in one of \( m \) corresponding random payoffs, \( (X_1, \cdots, X_m) \). Suppose each individual chooses style \( i \) with probability \( p_i \), for \( i = 1, 2, \cdots, m \). Let \( p = (p_1, \cdots, p_m) \) be the probability vector that characterizes an individual’s investment philosophy. \( p \) satisfies the following conditions:

\[
0 \leq p_i \leq 1, \quad \forall i = 1, \cdots, m
\]

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} p_i = 1.
\]

The style returns are determined by \( k \) pricing factors, \( \lambda = (\lambda_1, \cdots, \lambda_k) \). Let \( B = (\beta_{ij})_{m \times k} \) be the matrix of betas that satisfies the following conditions:

\[
0 \leq \beta_{ij} \leq 1, \quad \forall i = 1, \cdots, m; j = 1, \cdots, k
\]

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_{ij} = 1, \quad \forall i = 1, \cdots, m.
\]

These restrictions can be relaxed to different bounds and we use one for simplicity and tractability of the analytical results below.

In the multinomial choice model, the population growth rate is determined by both \( p \) and \( B \). Therefore, it is convenient to consider the number of offspring for individual \( i \) with type \( f = (p, B) \):

\[
X_i^{p,B} = I_{1,i}^{p}x_{1,i}^{B} + \cdots + I_{m,i}^{p}x_{m,i}^{B}
\]

\[33\text{See Zhang, Brennan, and Lo (2014a) for a discussion of the influence of common environmental factors in group selection using a similar model, and Lo and Zhang (2022) for an application in deriving the source of bias and discrimination.}\]
where \((I_1^p, \cdots, I_m^p)\) is the multinomial indicator variable with probability \(p = (p_1, \cdots, p_m)\):

\[
(I_1^p, \cdots, I_m^p) = \begin{cases}
(1, 0, \cdots, 0) & \text{with probability } p_1 \\
(0, 1, \cdots, 0) & \text{with probability } p_2 \\
& \cdots \\
(0, 0, \cdots, 1) & \text{with probability } p_m,
\end{cases}
\]

and the number of offspring produced by taking each action is given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
&x_{1,i}^B = \beta_{11} \lambda_1 + \cdots + \beta_{1k} \lambda_k \\
&\cdots \\
&x_{m,i}^B = \beta_{m1} \lambda_1 + \cdots + \beta_{mk} \lambda_k.
\end{align*}
\]

We assume that

(A1) \(\lambda_1, \cdots, \lambda_k\) are independent random variables with some well-behaved distribution functions, such that \((X_1, \cdots, X_m)\) and \(\log(p_1X_1 + \cdots + p_mX_m)\) have finite moments up to order 2 for all \(p = (p_1, \cdots, p_m)\) and \(B = (\beta_{ij})_{m \times k}\), and

(A2) \((\lambda_1, \cdots, \lambda_k)\) is IID over time and identical for all individuals in a given generation.

Similar to the binary choice model, it is convenient to define factor loadings of type \(f = (p, B)\) individuals. Define \(\alpha = (\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_k) = pB:\)

\[
(\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_k) = (p_1, \cdots, p_m) \begin{pmatrix}
\beta_{11} & \cdots & \beta_{1k} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\beta_{m1} & \cdots & \beta_{mk}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Note that \(\alpha_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k = 1\) by definition.

We denote the total number of type \(f\) individuals in generation \(T\) by \(n_T^f\). The following result characterizes the log-geometric-average growth rate of type \(f\) in the general \(m\)-choice \(k\)-factor setting.

**Proposition A.1.** Under assumptions (A1)-(A2), as the number of generations and the number of individuals in each generation increases without bound, \(T^{-1} \log n_T^f\) converges in probability to the log-geometric-average growth rate

\[
\mu(p, B) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \log (pB\lambda') \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \log (\alpha\lambda') \right].
\]
The next result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for factor loadings to be optimal.

**Proposition A.2.** \((\alpha^*_1, \cdots, \alpha^*_k)\) maximizes \((A.2)\) if and only if
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\alpha_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k \lambda_k}{\alpha^*_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_k \lambda_k} \right] \leq 1, \quad \forall (\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_k).
\] (A.3)

The next result characterizes the optimal type \(f^*\) that maximizes \((A.2)\).

**Proposition A.3.** Under assumptions (A1)-(A2), the optimal factor loading \(\alpha^* = (\alpha^*_1, \cdots, \alpha^*_k)\) that maximizes \((A.2)\) is given by:
\[
\alpha^* = \begin{cases} 
(1, 0, \cdots, 0) & \text{if } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1} \right] < 1, \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_3}{\lambda_2} \right] < 1, \cdots, \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_k}{\lambda_{k-1}} \right] < 1 \\
(0, 1, \cdots, 0) & \text{if } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_2} \right] < 1, \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_3}{\lambda_2} \right] < 1, \cdots, \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_k}{\lambda_{k-1}} \right] < 1 \\
\cdots & \\
(0, 0, \cdots, 1) & \text{if } \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_k}{\lambda_{k+1}} \right] < 1, \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_{k+1}} \right] < 1, \cdots, \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_k}{\alpha^*_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_l \lambda_l} \right] \leq 1 \\
\text{solution to (A.5)} & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\] (A.4)

In the last case, suppose without loss of generality that \(\alpha^* = (\alpha^*_1, \cdots, \alpha^*_l, 0, \cdots, 0)\). In other words, only the first \(l\) alphas are zero. Then \(\alpha^*\) in the last case of (A.4) is defined implicitly by:
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_1}{\alpha^*_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_l \lambda_l} \right] = \cdots = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_l}{\alpha^*_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_l \lambda_l} \right] = 1,
\] (A.5)
and \(\alpha^*\) satisfies:
\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_{l+1}}{\alpha^*_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_l \lambda_l} \right] &< 1 \\
\cdots & \\
\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_k}{\alpha^*_1 \lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_l \lambda_l} \right] &< 1.
\end{align*}
\] (A.6)

As a result, the growth-optimal investment philosophy solves the following systems of equations:
\[
p^* B = \alpha^*.
\]

Note that in Proposition A.3, it is not possible to fully characterize \(\alpha^*\) simply by the ratios \(\mathbb{E} [\lambda_i/\lambda_j]\). However, there is still a natural analog to the binary choice model based on (A.5) and (A.6). \(\alpha^* = (\alpha^*_1, \cdots, \alpha^*_i, 0, \cdots, 0)\) is optimal if and only if the expectation of any irrelevant factor divided by the optimal combination of factors is less than 1, and any factor in the optimal combination divided by the optimal combination is equal to 1.

In typical financial markets, the number of investment styles or assets is greater than the number of factors: \(m > k\). The actual optimization happens in the \(k\) dimensional space,
As a result, there might be multiple philosophies \((p_1, \cdots, p_m)\) that correspond to the same factor combinations \((\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_k)\), and therefore they coexist in the long run.

Proposition A.3 generalizes the main Proposition 1 in the binary choice model. Comparative statics results with respect to mean return, beta, and volatilities can therefore be carried out in principle.

B Diverse Investment Philosophies via Mutation

In our main model, we have derived the evolutionary equilibrium investment philosophy and demonstrated the survival of diverse investment styles in the long run, using both endogenous and exogenous style returns. Diverse investment philosophies can coexist in the long run with psychological effects such as attention to novelty. In the model, the investment philosophy \(f\) is assumed to be perfectly heritable across agents. We note here that by introducing mutation in investment philosophy \(f\) between two periods, as modeled by Brennan, Lo, and Zhang (2018) in a different context, our framework can achieve diversity in investment philosophies in equilibrium with only return-based replication rules.

Positive mutation rates lead to the survival of a mix of investment philosophies \(f\), which in unstable financial environments is important to rescue unpopular philosophies from extinction. In fact, depending on the degree of environmental instability, there is an evolutionary equilibrium mutation rate found by maximizing the population growth as a whole in the long run, as shown in the model of Brennan, Lo, and Zhang (2018). Thus, in highly unstable financial environments, the mutation rate should be higher, and a high degree of diversity in investment philosophies will be evolutionarily desirable for higher growth rates of the total population. In relatively stable financial environments, the mutation rate will be lower, which implies a low degree of diversity in investment philosophies. The diversity in investment philosophies is determined by market selection to match the degree of environmental instability.

There are several possible ways to estimate environmental instability empirically. For example, one can track the time variation in volatility using the VIX index as a proxy, or different interest rate environments using the US federal funds rate as a proxy. Future research should find it of interest to test whether a higher frequency of environmental change is associated with a higher degree of diversity in investment philosophies.
C Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. This is first proved by Brennan and Lo (2011) and we reproduce the proof here for completeness. This follows from the first and second derivatives of Equation (5). Because the second derivative is strictly negative, there is exactly one maximum value obtained in the interval [0, 1]. The values of the first-order derivative of \( \alpha(f) \) at the endpoints are given by:

\[
\alpha'(0) = \mathbb{E}[X_a/X_b] - 1, \quad \alpha'(1) = 1 - \mathbb{E}[X_b/X_a].
\]

If both are positive or both are negative, then \( \alpha(f) \) increases or decreases, respectively, throughout the interval and the maximum value is attained at \( f = 1 \) or \( f = 0 \), respectively. Otherwise, \( f = f^* \) is the unique point in the interval for which \( \alpha'(f) = 0 \), where \( f^* \) is defined in Equation (7), and it is at this point that \( \alpha(f) \) attains its maximum value. The expression in Equation (6) summarizes the results of these observations for the various possible values of \( \mathbb{E}[a/X_b] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[X_b/X_a] \). Note that the case \( \mathbb{E}[X_a/X_b] \leq 1 \) and \( \mathbb{E}[X_b/X_a] \leq 1 \) is not considered because this set of inequalities implies that \( \alpha'(0) \leq 0 \) and \( \alpha'(1) \geq 0 \), which is impossible since \( \alpha''(f) \) is strictly negative.

Proof of Proposition 2. \( \mathbb{E}[1/y] \) as given in (9) is a decreasing function of \( \mu_a \) and an increasing function of \( \mu_b \).

Proof of Lemma 1. According to the discussion leading to Lemma 1, calculations of second-order derivatives of \( y(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) \) suffice. For simplicity, we use \((0, 0, 0)\) to represent \( r = \epsilon_a = \epsilon_b = 0 \).

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial y}{\partial r} &= \beta_a (\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b) - \beta_b (\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a) = \beta_a \mu_b - \beta_b \mu_a + \beta_a \epsilon_b - \beta_b \epsilon_a \\
\frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial r^2} &= -2 \beta_b (\beta_a \mu_b - \beta_b \mu_a + \beta_a \epsilon_b - \beta_b \epsilon_a) (0,0,0) 2 \beta_b (\beta_a \mu_a - \beta_a \mu_b) \mu_b^2 \\
\frac{\partial y}{\partial \epsilon_a} &= \frac{1}{\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b}, \quad \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} = 0 \\
\frac{\partial y}{\partial \epsilon_b} &= - \frac{\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a}{(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b)^2} \\
\frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} &= \frac{2 (\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a)}{(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b)^3} (0,0,0) \frac{2 \mu_a}{\mu_b^3}.
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore,

\[
\mathbb{E}[y] \approx \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b} + \frac{\beta_b (\beta_a \mu_a - \beta_a \mu_b)}{\mu_b^2} \mathbb{E}[r^2] + \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b} \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_b^2] = \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b} + \frac{\beta_b^2}{\mu_b^2} \left( \frac{\mu_a}{\beta_a} - \frac{\mu_b}{\beta_b} \right) \text{Var}(r) + \frac{\mu_a}{\mu_b^2} \text{Var}(\epsilon_b),
\]

which completes the proof of the first part. The approximation for \( \mathbb{E}[1/y] \) follows from similar calculations.
Proof of Proposition 3. According to Lemma [1], $E[1/y]$ is a decreasing function of $\beta_b$; it is a quadratic function of $\beta_a$ and therefore turns at its vertex.

Proof of Proposition 4. It follows directly from Lemma [2].

Proof of Proposition 5. The first-order condition as given in (10) is a decreasing function of $\mu_a$, and a decreasing function of $\mu_b$. Therefore, as $\mu_a$ increases, the solution $f^*$ has to increase. Similarly, as $\mu_b$ decreases, the solution $f^*$ has to increase.

Proof of Lemma 2. For notational convenience, we let:

$$F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) \equiv \frac{(\mu_a - \mu_b) + (\beta_a - \beta_b)r + (\epsilon_a - \epsilon_b)}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b] + [f \beta_a + (1 - f)\beta_b]r + [f \epsilon_a + (1 - f)\epsilon_b]}.$$

The first-order condition reduces to $E[F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)] = 0$, and it suffices to calculate the second-order derivatives of $F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)$:

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial r} = \frac{(\beta_a - \beta_b)\{(f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b) + (f \epsilon_a + (1 - f)\epsilon_b)\} - (f \beta_a + (1 - f)\beta_b)\{(\mu_a - \mu_b) + (\epsilon_a - \epsilon_b)\}}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b] + [f \beta_a + (1 - f)\beta_b]r + [f \epsilon_a + (1 - f)\epsilon_b]}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r^2} = \frac{(0,0,0) - 2(f \beta_a + (1 - f)\beta_b)\{(\mu_a - \mu_b) + (\epsilon_a - \epsilon_b)\}^2}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b]^3}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} = \frac{(0,0,0) - 2f(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b)}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b]^3}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} = \frac{(0,0,0) - 2(1 - f)(\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a)}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b]^3}$$

Therefore,

$$E[F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)] \approx \frac{\mu_a - \mu_b}{f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r^2}E(r^2) - \frac{f \mu_b \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_b^2]}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b]^3} + \frac{(1 - f)(\mu_a E[\epsilon_b^2])}{[f \mu_a + (1 - f)\mu_b]^3}.$$

Rearranging terms gives the result.

Proof of Proposition 6. The condition described in Lemma 2 is a quadratic function of both $\beta_a$ and $\beta_b$. Simple calculations of the vertex suffice to prove the result.

Proof of Proposition 7. This follows directly from Lemma 2.

Proof of Proposition 8. This follows directly from Lemmas 1–2 and Assumption 5.

Proof of Proposition 9. This follows from the same derivations in the proof of Proposition 1 with $X_a$ replaced by $\psi(X_a)$ and $X_b$ replaced by $\psi(X_b)$.
Proof of Proposition 10. In general, the proof follows the same derivations as Lemma [1] and the proofs of Propositions 2–4, though replacing \( X_a \) by \( \psi(X_a) \) and \( X_b \) by \( \psi(X_b) \) added substantial analytical complexity.

Let \( z \equiv \psi(X_a)/\psi(X_b) \), so that

\[
E[z] = E \left[ \frac{\psi(X_a)}{\psi(X_b)} \right] = \frac{E[\psi(X_a) + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a]}{E[\psi(X_b) + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b]}, \tag{A.7}
\]

\[
E[1/z] = E \left[ \frac{\psi(X_b)}{\psi(X_a)} \right] = \frac{E[\psi(X_b) + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b]}{E[\psi(X_a) + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a]]. \tag{A.8}
\]

We focus on the case where style \( b \) dominates the population \( (f^*_b = 0) \), which happens when \( E[z] < 1 \). In other words, we need to identify conditions for which \( E[z] \) tends to decrease. The case where style \( b \) dominates the population \( (f^*_b = 1) \) is completely symmetric.

First, it is easy to see that \( E[z] \) is an increasing function of \( \mu_a \) and a decreasing function of \( \mu_b \). Similarly, \( E[1/z] \) is a decreasing function of \( \mu_a \) and an increasing function of \( \mu_b \), which proves case (i) of Proposition 10.

To prove case (ii) and (iii), we apply the Taylor approximation of \( z \) as a function of \( r, \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \) to obtain

\[
z(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) = \frac{\psi(X_a)}{\psi(X_b)} = \frac{\psi(\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a)}{\psi(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b)}
\]

\[
= z(0, 0, 0) + \frac{\partial z_0}{\partial r} r + \frac{\partial z_0}{\partial \epsilon_a} \epsilon_a + \frac{\partial z_0}{\partial \epsilon_b} \epsilon_b
\]

\[
+ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial r^2} r^2 + \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} \epsilon_a^2 + \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} \epsilon_b^2 + 2 \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial r \partial \epsilon_a} r \epsilon_a + 2 \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial r \partial \epsilon_b} r \epsilon_b + 2 \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial \epsilon_a \partial \epsilon_b} \epsilon_a \epsilon_b \right)
\]

\[
+ o(r^2, \epsilon_a^2, \epsilon_b^2).
\]

After taking the expected value of \( z \), the linear terms vanish, because \( E[r] = E[\epsilon_a] = E[\epsilon_b] = 0 \). The second-order cross terms also vanish because \( r, \epsilon_a \) and \( \epsilon_b \) are independent. Therefore, \( E[z] \) can be approximated by \( z(0, 0, 0) \) and the second-order terms:

\[
E[z] = E \left[ \frac{\psi(X_a)}{\psi(X_b)} \right] \approx \frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\psi(\mu_b)} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial r^2} Var(r) + \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} Var(\epsilon_a) + \frac{\partial^2 z_0}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} Var(\epsilon_b) \right).
\]

We then calculate second-order derivatives of \( z(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) \). For simplicity, we use \((0, 0, 0)\) to represent \( r = \epsilon_a = \epsilon_b = 0 \).

\[
\frac{\partial z}{\partial r} = \frac{\beta_a \psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b) - \beta_b \psi'(X_b) \psi(X_a)}{\psi^2(X_b)}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial r^2} = \frac{[\beta_a \psi''(X_a) \psi(X_b) - \beta_b \psi''(X_b) \psi(X_a)] \psi(X_b) - 2 \beta_b \beta_a \psi' \psi' \psi(0,0,0) [\beta_a \psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b) - \beta_b \psi'(X_b) \psi(X_a)] \psi'(X_b)}{\psi^3(X_b)}
\]

\[
+ \frac{\beta_a \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(0,0,0) [\beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) - \beta_b \psi'(\mu_b)] \psi(0,0,0) [\beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) \psi(0,0,0) [\beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) - \beta_b \psi'(\mu_b)] \psi'(\mu_b)}{\psi^3(\mu_b)}
\]

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We note that the derivations above reduces to our results in Section 4 when $\psi$ is the identity function. For general $\psi$ that satisfies Assumption 6, it is easy to see that $\frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial \epsilon^2} \leq 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} \geq 0$, which proves case (iii)(a) of Proposition 10.

Next, we analyze $\frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial \epsilon_b^2}$ to prove the remaining part of Proposition 10. First,

$$\frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial \epsilon^2} > 0 \iff \left[ \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - \beta_b^2 \psi''(\mu_b) \psi(\mu_a) \right] \psi(\mu_b) - 2 \beta_b [\beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - \beta_b \psi'(\mu_b) \psi(\mu_a)] \psi'(\mu_b) > 0$$

$$\iff \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \left[ 2 (\psi'(\mu_b))^2 - \psi(\mu_b) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] + \beta_a \psi'(\mu_b) [\beta_a \psi'(\mu_b) \psi''(\mu_a) - 2 \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b)] > 0$$

$$\iff \frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\beta_a} \left[ 2 (\psi'(\mu_b))^2 - \psi(\mu_b) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] > \frac{2 \psi'(\mu_b) \psi'(\mu_b) - \beta_a \beta_b \psi(\mu_b) \psi''(\mu_a)}{2 \psi'(\mu_b) \psi'(\mu_b) - \beta_a \beta_b \psi(\mu_b) \psi''(\mu_a)}.$$

When we consider the symmetric case of $\mathbb{E}[1/z]$, style $a$ and style $b$ are exchanged, so the last inequality becomes:

$$\frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\beta_a} \frac{\psi(\mu_b)}{\beta_b} < \frac{2 \psi'(\mu_b) \psi'(\mu_a) - \beta_a \beta_b \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b)}{2 (\psi'(\mu_a))^2 - \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_a)} \equiv C_2.$$

Note that $C_2$ reduces to 1 when $\psi$ is the identity function. This proves case (iii)(b-c) of Proposition 10.

Second, we note that $\frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial \epsilon_a^2}$, and therefore $\mathbb{E}[z]$, is a quadratic function of both $\beta_a$ and $\beta_b$. With respect to $\beta_a$, the coefficient of the quadratic term is

$$\psi''(\mu_a) \psi^2(\mu_b) \leq 0,$$

and the coefficient of the linear term is

$$-2 \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) \psi(\mu_b) \leq 0.$$
Therefore, $E[z]$ is a decreasing function of $\beta_a$ when $\beta_a$ is non-negative. This proves case (ii)(a) of Proposition 10 (when we consider the symmetric case of $E[1/z]$).

With respect to $\beta_b$, the coefficient of the quadratic term is

$$-\psi''(\mu_b)\psi(\mu_a)\psi(\mu_b) + 2(\psi'(\mu_b))^2\psi(\mu_a) \geq 0,$$

and the coefficient of the linear term is

$$-2\beta_a\psi'(\mu_a)\psi'(\mu_b)\psi(\mu_b) \leq 0.$$

Therefore, $E[z]$ achieves its minimum at its vertex:

$$\beta_b = \frac{\beta_a\psi'(\mu_a)\psi(\mu_b)}{2(\psi'(\mu_b))^2 - \psi''(\mu_b)\psi(\mu_b)} \Rightarrow \frac{\psi(\mu_a) / \beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b) / \beta_b} = \frac{\psi'(\mu_a)\psi(\mu_b)}{2(\psi'(\mu_b))^2 - \psi''(\mu_b)\psi(\mu_b)}.$$

When we consider the symmetric case of $E[1/z]$, style $a$ and style $b$ are exchanged, so the last equality becomes:

$$\frac{\psi(\mu_a) / \beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b) / \beta_b} = \frac{2(\psi'(\mu_a))^2 - \psi''(\mu_a)\psi(\mu_a)}{\psi'(\mu_b)\psi(\mu_a)} \equiv C_1.$$

Note that $C_1$ reduces to 2 when $\psi$ is the identity function. This proves case (ii)(b-c) of Proposition 10 and therefore completes the proof of the entire proposition.

**Proof of Proposition 11** When the evolutionary equilibrium philosophy involves both investment styles, $f_\psi^*$ is given by the first-order condition, (15). For notational convenience, we let:

$$F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) \equiv \frac{\psi(X_a) - \psi(X_b)}{f\psi(X_a) + (1 - f)\psi(X_b)} = \frac{\psi(\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a) - \psi(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b)}{f\psi(\mu_a + \beta_a r + \epsilon_a) + (1 - f)\psi(\mu_b + \beta_b r + \epsilon_b)}.$$

The first-order condition reduces to $E[F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)] = 0$. It is easy to verify that $F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)$ is a decreasing function of $f$. Therefore, we need to identify conditions that lead to higher values of $F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)$, which then leads to higher values of $f_\psi^*$ holding other factors constant.

We first calculate the partial derivatives of $F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b)$ with respect to $\mu_a$ and $\mu_b$:

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial \mu_a} = \frac{\psi'(X_a)[f\psi(X_a) + (1 - f)\psi(X_b)] - f\psi'(X_a)(\psi(X_a) - \psi(X_b))}{[f\psi(X_a) + (1 - f)\psi(X_b)]^2} = \frac{\psi'(X_a)\psi(X_b)}{[f\psi(X_a) + (1 - f)\psi(X_b)]^2} \geq 0,$$
\[ \frac{\partial F}{\partial \mu_b} = -\psi'(X_b) \left[ f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b) \right] + f \psi'(X_b) \left( \psi(X_a) - \psi(X_b) \right) \]
\[ = -\frac{\psi'(X_b) \psi(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \leq 0. \]

This proves case (i) of Proposition 11.

To derive further comparative statics, we again use a Taylor expansion to approximate the first-order condition:

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) \right] \approx \frac{\psi(\mu_a) - \psi(\mu_b)}{f \psi(\mu_a) + (1 - f) \psi(\mu_b)} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\partial^2 F_0}{\partial r^2} \text{Var}(r) + \frac{\partial^2 F_0}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} \text{Var}(\epsilon_a) + \frac{\partial^2 F_0}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} \text{Var}(\epsilon_b) \right). \]

It suffices to calculate the second-order derivatives of \( F(r, \epsilon_a, \epsilon_b) \):

\[ \frac{\partial F}{\partial r} = \frac{\beta_a \psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b) - \beta_b \psi(X_a) \psi'(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \]
\[ \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r^2} (0,0,0) \approx N_1 \]
\[ \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} (0,0,0) \approx \frac{\psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \]
\[ \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} (0,0,0) \approx -\frac{\psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \]
\[ \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_a \partial \epsilon_b} (0,0,0) \approx \frac{\psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \]
\[ \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r \partial \epsilon_a} (0,0,0) \approx \frac{\psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \]
\[ \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r \partial \epsilon_b} (0,0,0) \approx \frac{\psi'(X_a) \psi(X_b)}{[f \psi(X_a) + (1 - f) \psi(X_b)]^2} \]

Here

\[ N_1 = \left[ \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] \left[ f \psi(\mu_a) + (1 - f) \psi(\mu_b) \right] \]
\[ - 2 \left[ \beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - \beta_b \psi(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) \right] \left[ f \beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) + (1 - f) \beta_b \psi'(\mu_b) \right]. \]

We note that the derivations above reduces to our results in Section 4 when \( \psi \) is the identity function. For general \( \psi \) that satisfies Assumption 6, it is easy to see that \( \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_a^2} \leq 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \epsilon_b^2} \geq 0 \), which proves case (iii)(a-b) of Proposition 11.
Next, we analyze \( \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r^2} \) to prove the remaining part of Proposition [11]. First,

\[
\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r^2} > 0 \quad \implies \quad N_1 > 0
\]

\[
\implies \left[ \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_b) \psi(\mu_b) - \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] \left[ f \psi(\mu_a) + (1 - f) \psi(\mu_b) \right] > 2 \left[ \beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - \beta_b \psi(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) \right] \left[ f \beta_a \psi'(\mu_a) + (1 - f) \beta_b \psi'(\mu_b) \right]
\]

\[
\implies \left[ f \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - f \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] \psi(\mu_a) + \left[ (1 - f) \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - (1 - f) \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] \psi(\mu_b)
\]

\[
> \left[ 2 f \beta_a^2 (\psi'(\mu_a))^2 + 2(1 - f) \beta_a \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) \right] \psi(\mu_b) - \left[ 2 f \beta_a \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) + 2(1 - f) \beta_b^2 (\psi'(\mu_b))^2 \right] \psi(\mu_a)
\]

\[
\implies \psi(\mu_a) \left[ f \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - f \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] + 2 f \beta_a \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) + 2(1 - f) \beta_b^2 (\psi'(\mu_b))^2
\]

\[
> \psi(\mu_b) \left[ 2 f \beta_a^2 (\psi'(\mu_a))^2 + 2(1 - f) \beta_a \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) \right] - (1 - f) \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) + (1 - f) \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b)
\]

\[
\implies \frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\beta_a} \left[ f \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - f \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] + \left[ (1 - f) \beta_a^2 \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - (1 - f) \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b) \right] \psi(\mu_b)
\]

\[
> \frac{\psi(\mu_b)}{\beta_b} \left[ 2 f (\psi'(\mu_a))^2 + 2(1 - f) \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) \right] - (1 - f) \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) + (1 - f) \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b)
\]

\[
\implies \frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\beta_a} \psi(\mu_b) / \beta_b > C_4,
\]

where

\[
C_4 \equiv \frac{2 f (\psi'(\mu_a))^2 + 2(1 - f) \beta_b \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) - (1 - f) \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) + (1 - f) \beta_b^2 \psi(\mu_a) \psi''(\mu_b)}{f \beta_a \psi''(\mu_a) \psi(\mu_b) - f \beta_b \psi(\mu_b) \psi''(\mu_b) + 2 f \psi'(\mu_a) \psi'(\mu_b) + 2(1 - f) \beta_b \psi'(\mu_b)^2}.
\]

Note that \( C_4 \) reduces to 1 when \( \psi \) is the identity function. This proves case (iii)(c–d) of Proposition [11].

Second, we note that \( \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial r^2} \), and therefore the first order condition \( F \), is a quadratic function of both \( \beta_a \) and \( \beta_b \).
With respect to $\beta_a$, the coefficient of the quadratic term is

$$\psi''(\mu_a)\psi(\mu_b) [f\psi(\mu_a) + (1-f)\psi(\mu_b)] - 2f(\psi'(\mu_a))^2 \psi(\mu_b) \leq 0,$$

and the coefficient of the linear term is

$$2\beta_b\psi'(\mu_a)\psi'(\mu_b) (f\psi(\mu_a) - (1-f)\psi(\mu_b)).$$

Therefore, the first order condition achieves its maximum at its vertex:

$$\beta_a = -\frac{\beta_b\psi'(\mu_a)\psi'(\mu_b) (f\psi(\mu_a) - (1-f)\psi(\mu_b))}{\psi''(\mu_a)\psi(\mu_b) [f\psi(\mu_a) + (1-f)\psi(\mu_b)] - 2f(\psi'(\mu_a))^2 \psi(\mu_b)}$$

$$\Rightarrow \beta_a = \frac{\beta_b\psi'(\mu_a)\psi'(\mu_b) (f - (1-f)\frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\psi(\mu_b)})}{\psi(\mu_b) \left\{ 2f(\psi'(\mu_a))^2 - \psi''(\mu_a) [f\psi(\mu_a) + (1-f)\psi(\mu_b)] \right\}}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\psi(\mu_a)/\beta_a}{\psi(\mu_b)/\beta_b} = \frac{2f(\psi'(\mu_a))^2 - \psi''(\mu_a) [f\psi(\mu_a) + (1-f)\psi(\mu_b)]}{\psi(\mu_b)\psi'(\mu_a) (f - (1-f)\frac{\psi(\mu_a)}{\psi(\mu_b)})} \equiv C_3.$$

The derivation with respect to $\beta_b$ follows similarly, which would yield $C_3'$ by simply exchanging terms that correspond to style $a$ and style $b$. We note that the last equation reduces to the results in Proposition 6 when $\psi$ is the identity function. This proves case (ii) of Proposition 11 and therefore completes the proof of the entire proposition.

**Proof of Proposition 12** The market clearing conditions, (22), yields:

$$\frac{W_S\lambda_t}{W_F} = \left( \frac{P_{a,t}/\tilde{P}_{a,t}}{W_F} \right)^k \Rightarrow P_{a,t} = \tilde{P}_{a,t} \left( \frac{W_S\lambda_t}{W_F} \right)^\frac{1}{k},$$

$$\frac{W_S(1-\lambda_t)}{W_F} = \left( \frac{P_{b,t}/\tilde{P}_{b,t}}{W_F} \right)^k \Rightarrow P_{b,t} = \tilde{P}_{b,t} \left( \frac{W_S(1-\lambda_t)}{W_F} \right)^\frac{1}{k}. \quad (A.9)$$

In addition, the return processes in (16)–(17) yields:

$$R_{at} = \frac{P_{a,t}}{P_{a,t-1}} = \frac{\tilde{P}_{a,t} \left( \frac{W_S\lambda_t}{W_F} \right)^\frac{1}{k}}{\tilde{P}_{a,t-1} \left( \frac{W_S\lambda_{t-1}}{W_F} \right)^\frac{1}{k}} = X_{a,t} \left( \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t-1}} \right)^\frac{1}{k}, \quad (A.10)$$

$$R_{bt} = \frac{P_{b,t}}{P_{b,t-1}} = \frac{\tilde{P}_{b,t} \left( \frac{W_S(1-\lambda_t)}{W_F} \right)^\frac{1}{k}}{\tilde{P}_{b,t-1} \left( \frac{W_S(1-\lambda_{t-1})}{W_F} \right)^\frac{1}{k}} = X_{b,t} \left( \frac{1-\lambda_t}{1-\lambda_{t-1}} \right)^\frac{1}{k},$$

where we use the convention that $0/0 = 1$. This convention is innocuous because in the boundary cases when the aggregate demand stays as a constant, $\lambda_t = 0$ or 1, there is no
change in demand from the speculators and therefore fundamentalists will drive the return
to equal the fundamental value. An alternative way to avoid 0/0 is to add a small constant
demand to both styles in the specification (20), so that in the boundary cases the aggregate
demand in either asset does not vanish. This will not change the equilibrium prices and
returns in any essential way.

Proof of Proposition 13: The equilibrium philosophy $f^e$ is given by Proposition 1 with
$X_a$ and $X_b$ replaced by $R_a$ and $R_b$, and $\lambda_t$ replaced by $f^e$, because the aggregate
demand must equal the dominant philosophy in equilibrium. The terms $\left(\frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t-1}}\right)^\frac{1}{\pi}$ and $\left(\frac{1-\lambda_t}{1-\lambda_{t-1}}\right)^\frac{1}{\pi}$ in
(24) then vanishes, and the results follow.

Proof of Proposition A.1: The total number of type $f = (p, B)$ individuals in generation $T$ is:

$$n_T^f = \sum_{i=1}^{n_{T-1}^f} X_i^p B = \sum_{i=1}^{n_{T-1}^f} p_i^1 x_1^B + \cdots + p_i^m x_m^B = n_{T-1}^f \left( \frac{1}{n_{T-1}^f} \sum_{i=1}^{n_{T-1}^f} p_i^1 x_1^B + \cdots + p_i^m x_m^B \right).$$

As $n_{T-1}^f$ increases without bound, by Law of Large Numbers, it converges in probability to:

$$n_{T-1}^f (p_1 x_1^B + \cdots + p_m x_m^B) = n_{T-1}^f \cdot pB \lambda^t.$$ 

Through backward recursion, we have:

$$n_T^f = n_0^f \cdot \prod_{t=1}^{T} pB \lambda^t = \exp \left( \sum_{t=1}^{T} \log (pB \lambda^t) \right).$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{1}{T} \log n_T^f = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \log (pB \lambda^t) \Rightarrow \mathbb{E} [\log (pB \lambda^t)]$$

as $T$ increases without bound.

Proof of Proposition A.2: Note that (A.2) is a concave function with respect to $\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_k$, so a local maximum is the global maximum. Now suppose $\alpha^* = (\alpha_1^*, \cdots, \alpha_k^*)$ is a local maximum, then a necessary and sufficient condition is that if we move $\alpha^*$ toward a direction of any $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_k)$, the growth rate decreases. Formally, let

$$\alpha^\delta = (1 - \delta)\alpha^* + \delta \alpha,$$

where $\alpha$ is arbitrary and $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$, and

$$\mu(\alpha^\delta) = \mathbb{E} [\log (((1 - \delta)\alpha_1^* + \delta \alpha_1) \lambda_1 + \cdots + ((1 - \delta)\alpha_k^* + \delta \alpha_k) \lambda_k)].$$
Then, $\alpha^* = (\alpha^*_1, \ldots, \alpha^*_k)$ maximizes (A.2) if and only if:

$$\frac{\partial \mu(\alpha^\delta)}{\partial \delta} \bigg|_{\delta=0} \leq 0, \text{ for any } \alpha = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k),$$

which further leads to:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{(\alpha_1 - \alpha^*_1)\lambda_1 + \cdots + (\alpha_k - \alpha^*_k)\lambda_k}{\alpha^*_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_k\lambda_k} \right] \leq 0, \text{ for any } \alpha = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k)$$

$$\implies \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k\lambda_k}{\alpha^*_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha^*_k\lambda_k} \right] \leq 1, \text{ for any } \alpha = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k)$$

which completes the proof.

**Proof of Proposition A.3** The first $k$ conditions in (A.4) follow directly from the lemma. As of the last case, note that $\alpha_1 = 1 - \alpha_2 - \cdots - \alpha_k$ and we can write $\mu(\cdot)$ as a function of $(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k)$. Therefore $\alpha^*$ is given by the following equations:

$$\begin{cases} 
\frac{\partial \mu(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k)}{\partial \alpha_2} \bigg|_{\alpha_{l+1} = \cdots = \alpha_k = 0} = 0 \\
\frac{\partial \mu(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k)}{\partial \alpha_3} \bigg|_{\alpha_{l+1} = \cdots = \alpha_k = 0} = 0 \\
\vdots \\
\frac{\partial \mu(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k)}{\partial \alpha_l} \bigg|_{\alpha_{l+1} = \cdots = \alpha_k = 0} = 0.
\end{cases} \quad (A.11)$$

Also, the following partial derivatives must be negative:

$$\begin{cases} 
\frac{\partial \mu(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k)}{\partial \alpha_{l+1}} \bigg|_{\alpha^*} < 0 \\
\vdots \\
\frac{\partial \mu(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k)}{\partial \alpha_k} \bigg|_{\alpha^*} < 0.
\end{cases} \quad (A.12)$$

(A.11) yields

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_1}{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l\lambda_l} \right] = \cdots = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_l}{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l\lambda_l} \right].$$

Suppose that the value above equals $C$, then

$$1 = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l\lambda_l}{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l\lambda_l} \right] = (\alpha_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l)C = C.$$

(A.12) yields

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_l}{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l\lambda_l} \right] < \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\lambda_1}{\alpha_1\lambda_1 + \cdots + \alpha_l\lambda_l} \right] = 1.$$
for $j = l + 1, l + 2, \ldots, k$. which completes the proof.
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